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Is the United States v. Olin Decision Full of Sound
and Fury Signifying Nothing?:
The Future of Retroactive Liability of the
Comprehensive Environmental Response,

Compensation, and Liability Act
I. INTRODUCTION
"This land is your land, this land is our land, from California to the New York Island"'

Modem hazardous waste statutes have a prodigious reach.' For example, selling a bag of dog chow to the wrong client has actually engendered liability under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), a major environmental statute.'
Despite the obvious absence of a realistic connection between hazardous
waste and dog food, a five dollar bag of dog food ultimately cost the
seller over three thousand dollars. For this feed business owner, the
connection proved all too real.
To be sure, liability emanating from a dog food sale is an oddity transcending even CERCLA's broad liability scheme. Therefore, by Way of
instruction, this Comment will utilize the following hypothetical, but
more common, CERCLA situation.4 In 1975, Girl Scout Troop 1313 buys
1. WOODY GUTHRIE, This Land is Your Land (Ludlow Music, Inc. 1956).
2. Besides CERCLA, these statutes include the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992k (1994); the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide
and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA), 7 U.S.C. § 136 (1994); and the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA), 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2629 (1994). See Jerry L. Anderson, The Hazardous Waste Land, 13 VA. ENVTL L.J. 1, 6-7 (1993) (noting that the scope of CERCLA
liability has grown increasingly broader since the statute's enactment in 1980).
3. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1994); see Jack Anderson & Michael Binstein,
Superfund Inadvertently Forces Innocents to Pay, PORTLAND OREGONIAN, Mar. 7, 1994,
at B7, available in 1994 WL 4558097. Russ Zimmer settled with the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) for $3500 after being named in a hazardous waste lawsuit
merely because he accepted third-party checks from a plant that salvaged used batteries. See id. The checks constituted payment for a bag of dog food and a bag of
seed. See id.
4. The following example utilizing the fictitious Girl Scout Troop 1313 is, by no

a piece of property from chemical conglomerate Toxluv Corporation,
hoping to turn it into a permanent camp site for use by troops in the
surrounding area. A few months later troop leaders determine that lack
of funding will preclude them from building the campsite. Girl Scout
Troop 1313 immediately re-sells the property to a local developer intending to build a business park on the plot. Unbeknownst to the Girl Scout
troop leaders, the prior owner, Toxluv, had buried several drunms filled
with hazardous chemicals on a remote section of the site. Girl Scout
Troop 1313 never discovered the existence of the barrels during their
brief, transient ownership of the site.
A few years later in 1980, Congress enacts CERCLA,5 vowing to clean
up the calamitous hazardous waste problem nationwide. CERCLA defines
four distinct classes of liable parties, otherwise known as potentially
responsible parties (PRPs), and courts unanimously find that the statutory scheme applies retroactively.7 As a result, once a party is defined as
a PRP it is potentially liable for any acts or omissions committed prior to
the CERCLA's enactment. The innocuous Troop 1313, who committed no
"act" other than transitory ownership of this site, will be classified as a
PRP.8 Moreover, because CERCLA simply requires a "release or substantial threat of release" to trigger liability,' the Girl Scout troop could be

means, an uncommon one. See Anderson & Binstein, supra note 3, at B7; John J. Lyons, Comment, Deep Pockets and CERCLA: Should Superfund Liabilitp Be Abolished?, 6 STAN. ENVTL. .J. 271, 308 n.172 (1987) (noting a case which held that an
owner of property for one hour could be held liable as a matter of law) (citing United States v. Carolawn Co., 21 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 2124, 2128 (1991)).
5., The terms CERCLA and Superfund will be used interchangeably throughout this
discussion.
6. CERCLA classifies four categories of potential defendants: (1) current owners
and operators of hazardous waste disposal facilities; (2) past owners and operators;
(3) generators of hazardous waste; and (4) transporters of hazardous waste. See 42
U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1)-(4) (1994).
7. See, e.g., Ohio ex rel. Brown v. Georgeoff, 562 F. Supp 1300, 131.3-14 (N.D.
Ohio 1983).
8. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a). Girl Scout Troop 1313 would be classified as a "past
owner" PRP. See id. § 9607(a)(2); see infra note 65 and accompanying text
9. See 42 U.S.C. § 9604(a)(1). CERCLA defines a release very liberally to include
"spilling, leaking . . . emptying, discharging ....
escaping, leaching." See id.
§ 9601(22). "Disposal may occur without any volitional human participation. All that
is required is that the hazardous substance has been released into the environment at
some point during a party's control of the facility." HRW Sys., Inc. v. Washington Gas
Light Co., 823 F. Supp. 318, 339 (D. Md. 1993) (citing Nurad, Inc. v. William E.
Hooper & Sons Co., 966 F.2d 837 (4th Cir. 1992) (citations omitted); see also New
York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1045 (2d Cir. 1985) (holding that "leaking
tanks and pipelines, the continuing leaching and seepage from the earlier spills, and
the leaking drums" were all releases and that defendant's inexpert handling of the
hazardous waste was a threat of release).
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liable for millions of dollars in site cleanup costs resulting from their
brief term of ownership. Despite its barely-traceable involvement with
the site and lack of knowledge regarding any waste disposal committed
by prior owner ToxLuv, the troop will be drawn into a lawsuit or forced
to settle"'-either option costing them sums of money well beyond their
causal culpability." Moreover, the Girl Scout troop in 1975 had no way
of forseeing its post-1980 CERCLA liability and thus no opportunity to
spread or otherwise internalize the costs. 2

10. CERCLA specifically defines and limits possible defenses. See Michael P. Healy,
Direct Liability For Hazardous Substance Cleanups Under CERCLA: A Comprehensive Approach, 42 CASE W. RES. L REV. 65, 96-99 (1992) (analyzing the available
defenses and commenting that their limited natures reflect congressional intent to
give CERCLA wide-ranging liability). The statute promulgates three available defenses:
"(1) an act of God; (2) an act of war, (3) an act or omission of a third party other
than an employee or agent of the defendant." See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b). While the
third enumerated defense would seem to be the only practical defense to liability, it
asks a great deal and places significant constraints on those defendants who would
claim it. For a discussion of this so-called "innocent landowner" defense, see Joseph
R. Dancy & Victoria A. Dancy, Oil and Gas Issues Involved in CERCLA
Reauthorization, 27 ST. MARY'S LJ. 103, 109 & nn.24-26 (1995). In interpreting language regarding the requisite inquiry a third party must make the courts have applied
the standards "in effect at the time of the purchase." See HRW Systems, 823 F. Supp.
at 348 (adding that it is a "question of what the [purchaser] knew"). In the scenario
offered by this Comment, the Girl Scouts will be held to the standards of inquiry of
1975 with particular weight given to any knowledge that may have caused them to
make an inquiry, particularly given the fact they were purchasing from a chemical
company. See id. But see George Van Cleve, Would the Superfund Response Cost
Allocation Procedures Considered by the 103D Congress Reduce Transaction Costs?,
25 Envtl. L Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10134 (March 1995), available in WESTLAW, 25
ELR 10134 (asserting that intermediate landowners who purchase after 1980 and contribute no contamination could be considered not liable or be allocated a part of
liability depending upon the federal circuit in which the case is heard).
11. The mere act of being named a PRP triggers considerable transaction costs.
See Van Cleve, supra note 10, at 10134 nn.4-7 (analyzing the debilitating Superfund
transaction costs); see also William N. Hedeman et a., Superfund Transaction Costs:
A Critical Perspective On The Superfund Liability Scheme, 21 Envtl. L Rep. (Envtl.
L. Inst.) 10413 (July 1991), available in WESTLAW, 21 ELR 10413 (asserting that the
substantial transaction costs are innate to CERCLA's liability scheme and thus unavoidably provide serious obstacles to CERCLA site cleanup success); Lyons, supra
note 4, at 271-72 (commenting on the overwhelming transaction costs of CERCLA and
the ways in which it hinders cleanups).
12. The concept of internalizing costs theorizes that a polluter must bear the
weight of the true cost of his actions, otherwise he will exercise little or no care in
handling the hazardous wastes. See Michael J. Gergen, The Failed Promise of the
"PolluterPays" Principle: An Economic Analysis of Landowner Liability for Hazard-

Despite its attenuated nexus to the hazardous waste disposal, Girl
Scout Troop 1313 faces staggering liability costs resulting from
CERCLA's potent triumvirate of strict liability,"3 joint and several liability 4 , and retroactive liability." Additionally, the frequent presence of
so-called "orphan shares-PRPs who have declared bankruptcy or otherwise cannot pay-compounds the liability burden. Thus, because

ous Waste, 69 N.Y.U. L REv. 624, 627-28 (1994); Lynda J. Oswald, Strict Liability of
Individuals Under CERCLA: A Normative Analysis, 20 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 579,
594-95 (1993). If the polluter is not required to pay for his waste disposal then his
pollution becomes an "external cost" which is borne by others in society. See Gergen,
supra, at 627. Additionally, the polluter adopts an irresponsible attitude about hazardous waste disposal because he does not have to factor into his gains the internalized
costs of his pollution. See id. at 627-28. CERCLA promulgates a "polluter pays" principle to force landowners to internalize the costs of their pollution. See infra notes
154-55 and accompanying text. The polluter pays principle of CERCLA loses force
when applied retroactively because the polluter had no way to internalize the costs.
See Anderson, supra note 2, at 36; Gary T. Schwartz, New Products, Old Products,
Evolving Law, Retroactive Law, 58 N.Y.U. L REV. 796, 825 (1983).
13. CERCLA defines liability by reference to "the standard of liability which obtains under section 1321 of Title 33," the Clean Water Act. See 42 U.S.C. § 9601(32).
Legislative history shows that Congress was aware in promulgating this statutory
language that courts had interpreted section 1321 of CWA to impose strict liability.
See United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802, 805 (S.D. Ohio 1983); see
also General Elec. Co. v. Litton Indus. Automation Sys., Inc., 920 F.2d 1415, 1418 (8th
Cir. 1990) (stating that CERCLA is a strict liability statute).
14. See United States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160, 171 (4th Cir. 1988) (finding
that "[w]hile CERCLA does not mandate the imposition of joint and several liability,
it permits it in cases of indivisible harm"); Chem-Dyne, 572 F. Supp. at 810-11
(holding that CERCLA presumptively imposed joint and several liability requiring a defendant to show a reasonable basis to apportion the harm). But see United States v.
A & F Materials Co., 578 F. Supp. 1249, 1254 (S.D. Ill. 1984) (holding that courts
may impose strict liability but also may consider the "Gore factors" in dividing the
harm).
15. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a); Ohio ex rel. Brown v. Georgeoff, 562 F. Supp. 1300,
1313-14 (N.D. Ohio 1983) (concluding that Congress intended CERCLA to apply retroactively to transporters). In summary, CERCLA triggers strict liability, joint and
several liability, and retroactive liability. This liability "trifecta" has engendered the
gross inequity that so many perceived, whereby a PRP (like Troop 1313) with a tenuous connection to a hazardous waste disposal site can ultimately shoulder the bulk
of the liability. See Anderson, supra note 2, at 6 (noting that "cleanup costs are often
borne by those who are not responsible for the problem at all, and that many other
parties are held liable to an extent far exceeding their actual responsibility."); see
also 132 CONG. REc. E1353-54 (daily ed. April 23, 1986) (statement of Rep. Ritter)
("[Any generator, any transporter, any waste-site owner or operator can be held
responsible for full costs even if what it did was totally without fault and had only
the most trivial consequences.").
16. See William D. Evans, Jr., The Continuing Problem of Allocating Orphan
Shares in CERCLA Litigation, WEST'S LEGAL NEWS, Oct. 22, 1996, available in 1996
WL 600021 (stating that "the request to solvent PRPs to carry insolvent parties cre-
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CERCLA is retroactive, it draws many more PRPs within the scope of the
orphan share effect, the inequitable impact of CERCLA stems from this
cumulative effect of the liabilities. 7 The foregoing scenario, while fictional in this instance, is nightmarishly real for the thousands of parties,
like Troop 1313, who somehow find their names attached to a waste
site."5
Because multitudes of Troop 1313s exist, a host of reformers from all
levels of government and law urge major restructuring of CERCLA."9

ates controversy, to say the least, within the PRP group," and citing United States v.
Atlas Minerals and Chems., Inc., Civ. A. No. 91-5118, 1995 WL 510304 (E.D. Pa. Aug.
22, 1995) in which the court noted that about 19% of a $25 million cleanup was
attributable to orphan shares).
17. See John Shanahan, Superfund Status Quo: Why The Reauthorization Bills
Won't Fix Superfund's Fatal Flaws, The Heritage Foundation Issue Bulletin No. 204,
Oct. 3, 1994 (visited Jan. 30, 1997) <http://www.heritage/library/categories/enviro/ib204
.html>. If CERCLA applies retroactively to a minor player such as Troop 1313, that
PRP can be brought within the web of strict liability and be potentially responsible
for the entire cost of cleanup under joint and several liability. This disparate impact
results from the controversial nexus initiated by retroactive liability. See Anderson,
supra note 2, at 6-8 (characterizing the entire process as "an extremely irrational
distribution of liability" and terming it a "liability lottery").
18. These parties have included churches, Girl Scouts, and widows. See Dancy &
Dancy, supra note 10, at 117 n.65 (listing unusual parties who have been the subject
of PRP suits) (citing Ridgway M. Hall et al., Superfund Response Cost Allocations:
The Law, the Science, and the Practice, 49 BuS. LAW. 1489, 1491 (1994)). In 1993,
several members of Congress attempted to exclude certain parties, such as municipal
landfills and small businesses, from liability through an amendment to Superfund
called the Toxic Cleanup Equity and Acceleration Act of 1993. See 139 CONG. REC.
S5947-53 (statements of Senators Lautenberg and Wellstone) (daily ed. 1993); 139
CONG. REc. E277-78 (daily ed. Feb. 4, 1993) (statement of Rep. Torricelli). Members
of Congress urged the reform because of what they perceived as inequitable results
flowing out of CERCLA litigation and enforcement. A sense of injustice permeates
their introductory comments to the legislation. "[Tihousands of local governments,
small businesses, and individual citizens across the country have learned that the
simple act of taking out the garbage can result in multimillion dollar lawsuits." 139
CONG. REC. E277 (daily ed. Feb. 4, 1993) (statement of Rep. Torricelli). "The Girl
Scouts and Boy Scouts, churches, pizza parlors, and other innocent parties have been
faced with extortionate claims by the real polluters." 139 CONG. REC. S5947 (daily ed.
May 13, 1993) (statement of Sen. Lautenberg). "Among the small businesses being extorted for having their waste brought to the Oak Grove Municipal Landfill are a donut shop and travel agent." 139 CONG. REC. S5953 (daily ed. May 13, 1993) (statement
of Sen. Wellstone).
19. Government officials on both sides of the debate call for CERCLA reform. See
Dancy & Dancy, supra note 10, at 105 n.5 (citing Bernard J. Reilly, Stop Superfund

While some support for maintaining the status quo exists, the more pervasive notion holds that CERCLA falls woefully short of its original and
most fundamental charge--to clean up hazardous waste sites across the
country-and ushers in a new urgency for the statute's reform. 0 Instead
of marshaling and funding cleanups, CERCLA has left a bitter trail of
broken promises and bankrupt Troop 1313s.2 Many tab CERCLA's retroactivity as a primary cause of this disappointment.' Following several

Waste, ISSUES IN SCI. AND TECH., Spring 1993, at 57). Several members of Congress

made provocative statements regarding CERCLA reform: "Why are we not moving
ahead with Superfund reform? We should be. Now is the opportunity." 142 CONG.
REC. H6767, H6771 (daily ed. June 25, 1996) (statement of Rep. Boehlert); "I would
say the 'Nightmare on Elm Street' has been running for the last 15 years, and it is
called the existing Superfund law . . . ." 142 CONG. REC. H6767, H6778 (daily ed.
June 25, 1996) (statement of Rep. Oxley). "We can just continue on our merry way
and pour money down a rat hole instead of really solving the problem." 142 CONG.
REC. H6779 (daily ed. June 25, 1996) (statement of Rep. Oxley). Legal scholars have
joined the chorus urging CERCLA reform. See, e.g., Anderson, supra note 2, at 67
(calling CERCLA "a black hole that indiscriminately devours all who come near it");
Jerome M. Organ, Superfund and the Settlement Decision: Reflections On The Relationship Between Equity And Efficiency, 62 GEO. WASH. L REV. 1043, 1043-44 (1994)
(arguing that Congress should "amend CERCLA"); Jonathan I.J. Goldberg, Note, An
Uncertain Future: Retroactivity, Insurance, and the EC's Attempts at Environmental
Liability, 33 VA. J. INT'L L 685, 714 (1993) ("CERCLA's 'draconian environmental
liability' regime has been much more effective at generating law suits than it has at
cleaning up pollution.") (quoting The Object Lesson at Wheat Jane, ENERGY ECONOMIST, Jan. 1, 1992); Lyons, supra note 4, at 271-73 (urging a "radical alteration" of
CERCLA funding through taxation).
20. The site remediation pace shows some signs of quickening; the EPA recently
announced that it has cleaned up its 400th site since the statute's enactment See
EPA Is Making Progress on Speeding Up Superfund Cleanups, WEST'S LEGAL NEWS,
October 17, 1996, available in 1996 WL 592354. Tellingly, over 75% of the worst toxic
sites on the National Priorities List (NPL) await clean up. See id. Moreover, the
cleanup cost has reached the $20 billion plateau and still rises, unimpeded. See
Dancy & Dancy, supra note 10, at 105 n.7. Perhaps the most troubling fact is that
new dump sites continue to emerge; some estimate that the eventual number of sites
needing cleanup will exceed 10,000 and will cost up to $120 billion. See id. (citing
Dennis Wamsted, CBO Study Sees Costly Future for Superfund, ENV'T Wi., Feb. 3,
1994, at 1, 12).
21. In one case, a limited partnership had spent $1.2 million on a project and then
was compelled to declare bankruptcy following the discovery that the development
land it had purchased was contaminated. See NL Indus., Inc. v. Kaplan, 792 F.2d 896,
897 (9th Cir. 1986).
22. See, e.g., Dancy & Dancy, supra note 10, at 109-110; Dale A. Oesterle, Viewing
CERCLA as Creating an Option on the Marginal Firm: Does it Encourage Irresponsible Environmental Behavior?, 26 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 39, 47 & n.27 (1991) (calling
retroactivity "unconscionable"); Goldberg, supra note 19, at 713. But see Development
in the Law-Toxic Waste Litigation: V. Liability Issues in CERCLA Cleanup Actions, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1511, 1540-41 (1986) [hereinafter Development] (stating that
courts are "correct" for finding CERCLA retroactive); Healy, supra note 10, at 82-83
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uninterrupted years of retroactive application, a 1996 Alabama District
Court in United States v. Olin Corp., became the first court to hold that
CERCLA should not apply retroactively.' In addition, several congressional leaders have recently conditioned CERCLA reauthorization on the
elimination of the retroactive element of CERCLA's liability scheme.24
As criticism of CERCLA mounts, retroactivity draws much fire. 5 Given
the atmosphere of reform already hovering in the air, these recent developments warrant a renewed look at the viability and fairness of
CERCLA retroactivity. Olin's reversal on appeal does not minimize the
underlying CERCLA policy debate which continues to be waged, and
Olin continues to be a lightning rod for discussion of CERCLA retroactivity. This Comment will further that discussion by addressing whether

(claiming that through its retroactive impact "CERCLA ensures that those parties
[who were responsible and profited] ultimately bear the full cost of their activities");
Amy Blaymore, Comment, Article and Comment: Retroactive Application of
Superfund: Can Old Dogs Be Taught New Tricks?, 12 B.C. ENVTL AFF. L. REV. 1,
3,36 (1985) (concluding that CERCLA retroactive application is constitutional and
fundamental to Congress's desire to clean up waste sites).
23. See United States v. Olin Corp., 927 F. Supp 1502 (S.D. Ala. 1996), rev'd, 107
F.3d 1506 (11th Cir. 1997). In March 1997, Olin was overturned on appeal. See United States v. Olin Corp., 107 F.3d 1506 (11th Cir. 1997). Judge Kravitch, writing for
the panel, held that contrary to Judge Hand's lower court ruling, Congress manifested
a clear intent for CERCLA to be retroactive and stated that the district court's ruling
was unsoundly based upon the argument that CERCLA was a compromise bill which
lacked that intent See id. at 1514. Judge Kravitch added that the compromise did not
turn upon retroactivity and that the legislative history clearly revealed an intent on
the part of Congress for CERCLA to reach retroactive conduct. See id.
24. See Ways-Means Leaders Say Retroactive Liability Under CERCLA Must Be
Repealed, 40 Banking Rep. (BNA) No. 8, at 365 (Feb. 20, 1995) [hereinafter WaysMeans]; see also Dancy & Dancy, supra note 10, at 110 (citing Exception for Federal
Facilities Sought in Call to Eliminate Retroactive Liability, 25 Env't Rep. (BNA) No.
39, at 1870 (Feb. 3, 1995) (stating that members of both political parties propose
eliminating CERCLA retroactivity)). Superfund's taxing authority was set to expire on
December 31, 1995 and the re-authorization funding bill remains stalled in committee.
See Ways-Means, supra, at 365. For a discussion of the ongoing reauthorization battles see infra notes 71-77 and accompanying text.
25. See, e.g., Dancy & Dancy, supra note 10, at 109; Ways-Means, supra note 24,
at 365; House Committee Leaders Push For Repeat of Retroactive, Joint and Several
Liability, 25 Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 41, at 1999 (Feb. 17, 1995) [hereinafter House
Committee Leaders]; see also Mark D. Tucker, 'Retroactive Liability' Is Challenged,
NAT'L L. J., Oct 14, 1996, at Cl (discussing the effect that eliminating retroactive liability will have on corporations).

CERCLA retroactivity should continue and what form it should ultimately
adopt.
Section II of this Comment frames the statute in its impetus and legislative history.26 First, this section traces the congressional actions and
social outcry which triggered CERCLA's passage. More particularly,
this section measures the congressional intent behind retroactivity, given
its central role in any judicial ruling on the question. This section will
then examine the early line of court cases which established the retroactive liability.2 Finally, Section II looks to recent events culminating in
the United States v. Olin Corp. decision denying CERCLA retroactivity
and its subsequent reversal on appeal.' Section III documents the arguments supporting CERCLA retroactivity as imperative to the bill's purpose.' Section IV presents the fundamental arguments in opposition to
CERCLA retroactive application, focusing on fairness.31 Section V lays
out several viable proposals for CERCLA modification and reform.2
Section VI concludes that, in order to both remain true to its site cleanup mission and to avoid egregious inequities, CERCLA should adopt a
negligence standard for pre-enactment PRPs-thereby applying retroactivity only to culpable parties.'
II. BACKGROUND & HISTORY: CERCLA ENACTMENT & CASE HISTORY

A. Legislative History of CERCLA
During the 1970s, a wave of legislation crashed through Congress,
forcefully impelled by the public's outrage over environmental damage
from toxic wastes.' Pre-CERCLA, the two dominant pieces of legislation were the 1972 Clean Water Act (CWA)n and the 1976 Resource

26. See infra notes 34-143 and accompanying text.
27. See infra notes 34-77 and accompanying text.
28. See infra notes 78-97 and accompanying text.
29. See infra notes 98-143 and accompanying text.
30. See infra notes 144-68 and accompanying text.
31. See infra notes 169-214 and accompanying text.
32. See infra notes 215-33 and accompanying text
33. See infra notes 234-42 and accompanying text.
34. See Healy, supra note 10, at 68-69. The most widely publicized toxic incidents
that motivated CERCLA's passage were Love Canal, "Valley of the Drums," and the
James River discharges. See id.;see also William D. Evans, Jr., The Chaotic Quality
of Superfund Contribution Litigation, WEST'S LEGAL NEWS, Sept 13, 1996, at 7, available in 1996 WL 516196 ("CERCLA was the product of disturbing media reports in
the late 1970s on hazardous waste sites, such as New York State's Love Canal, that
focused public attention on the national toxic waste disposal problem."); OTgan, supra
note 19, at 1046 n.17; Blaymore, supra note 22, at 1.
35. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1983 & Supp. 1997). The Clean Water Act gave the
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Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA). RCRA sections 7002 and
7003, in particular, ignited a substantial amount of litigation because they
granted the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) authority to sue in
order to "restrain persons from contributing to any waste activities
which may present an imminent and substantial endangerment to health
or the environment."' RCRA, a largely prospective statute, proved incapable of meeting the remedial needs of catastrophic environmental
events such as Love Canal, the infamous toxic waste disaster of the late
1970s which sparked the public demand for tougher legislation.' Sensing danger, Congress quickly responded with the remedially-focused
CERCLA to combat past hazardous waste problems which would only
later reveal their true toxic natures.'
CERCLA's legislative journey is a rough tale incompletely told.0 Several predecessor bills never reached legislative adulthood;4' CERCLA it-

EPA the ability to act when hazardous substances were released. See id.
§ 1321(b)(1).
36. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6987 (Supp. 1981). RCRA is primarily a regulatory statute
which charges generators of hazardous wastes and others with tracking the wastes
from "cradle to grave." See Blaymore, supra note 22, at 4 (discussing the purposes of

RCRA).
37. See 42 U.S.C. § 6973 (1994); Blaymore, supra note 22, at 5; see also Dancy &
Dancy, supra note 10, at 111 (commenting that Congress passed RCRA in order to
regulate waste activities occurring post-enactment); Oswald, supra note 12, at 603-04
n.94 (noting the forward-looking nature of RCRA while underscoring CERCLA's remedial purpose).
38. See Healy, supra note 10, at 68-69 & n.10; Blaymore, supra note 22, at 1-3.
39. CERCLA was a fundamentally retrospective bill. See Dancy & Dancy, supra
note 10, at 106; Healy, supra note 10, at 68; Oswald, supra note 12, at 603 n. 94;
Blaymore, supra note 22, at 1-3; see also Organ, supra note 19, at 1046 (stating that
present regulatory statutes were "incapable" of dealing with environmental waste evils
from "past waste disposal practices").
40. With CERCLA, Congress rushed a complex piece of legislation to maturity
ahead of its time. See Frank P. Grad, A Legislative History of the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability ("Superfund'9 Act of 1980, 8
COLUM. J. ENVrL. L. 1, 1 (1982).
41. The 95th Congress twice attempted to handle the oil and toxic spill.problem.
See, e.g., Hazardous Waste Containment Act, H.R. 7020, 96th Cong. (1980), reprinted
in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N.; the Comprehensive Oil Pollution Liability and Compensation Act,
H.R. 85, 96th Cong. (1979); and the Environmental Emergency Response Act, S. 1480,
96th Cong. (1979); S. 2900, 95th Cong. (1978) (toughening the oil and hazardous substance provisions of the Clean Water Act); S. 2083, 95th Cong. (1978); H.R. 6803, 95th
Cong. (1978) (attempting to create oil pollution liability and compensation). See also
George Clemon Freeman, Jr., A Public Policy Essay: Superfund Retroactivity Revisit-

self was a compromise bill formulated out of the remains of three previous attempts to deal with the hazardous waste fiascoes.4" The Congressional debates reveal great stress over several elements of
Superfund-most notably its liability scheme.' Unfortunately, the actual
political machinations and behind-the-scene maneuverings which propelled the bill's enactment have escaped proper telling; the statute's legislative history is an abnormally lean one for a major bill." We do know
that a "lame duck" Congress, in the waning days of a power shift from
the Carter Administration to the Reagan Administration, quickly herded
the bill through a narrow opening.45 Several key Senators, who had objected to prominent aspects of the bill including its latent retroactivity,6
were suddenly "persuaded" to change their minds and came out in support of the bill.4" The fairly abrupt philosophical reversals on fundamental issues like retroactivity suggested the determinist mood of these holdout Senators to enact a hazardous waste law in some form, no matter
how premature, to meet the emerging crisis.'

ed, 50 Bus. LAW. 663, 673 (Feb., 1995) (highlighting the bills which preceded
CERCLA); Grad, supra note 40, at 1-7 (analyzing the predecessor bills).
42. See, e.g., S. 1480, 96th Cong. (1980); H.R. 7020, 96th Cong. (1980); H.R. 85,
96th Cong. (1979). See generally STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON ENV'T & PUB. WORKS,
97TH CONG., 2D SESS., A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE COMPREHENSIVE ENVT'L RESPONSE,

COMPENSATION, AND LIABILITY ACT OF 1980 (SUPERFUND), PUBLIC LAW 96-510 V (Comm.
Print 1983) [hereinafter COMMITTEE PRINT], available in WESTLAW, CERCLA-LH database (presenting the history and related documents pertinent to the passage of
CERCLA); Freeman, supra note 41, at 672-78 (summarizing the journey of the bill

through Congress).
43. See generally Grad, supra note 40, at 14-35 (tracing the battles in Congress
over CERCLA). CERCLA's potential retroactivity garnered a considerable amount of
concern in Congress. See S. REP. NO. 848, at 119-22 (1980).
44. See infra notes 46-48 and accompanying text; see also United States v. Olin
Corp., 927 F. Supp. 1502, 1513 (S.D. Ala. 1996), rev'd, 107 F.3d 1506 (11th Cir. 1997)
(commenting that CERCLA's legislative history is devoid of substance); Development,
supra note 22, at 151 (calling CERCLA's legislative history "unhelpful"); Grad, supra
note 40, at I (detailing the rushed nature of the bill's passage).

45. See Ohio v. Georgeoff, 562 F. Supp. 1300, 1310 n.12 (N.D. Ohio 1983); Freeman, supra note 41, at 673; Grad, supra note 40, at 1.
46. See Grad, supra note 40, at 14 (discussing the concerns of Senators Domenici,
Bentsen, and Baker about potential retroactivity of the bill).
47. See Freeman, supra note 41, at 673-75. These apparent reversals occurTed without the detailed record of the legislative history upon which legal scholars typically
rely. See Grad, supra note 40, at 1 (noting debate was limited, rules done away with,
and amendments disallowed because of the time pressures and lame duck nature of
this Congress).
48. See Freeman, supra note 41, at 676. The letter from Senators Stafford and
Randolph which accompanied the bill to the House stated:

That the bill passed at all is a minor wonder. Only the frailest, moment-tomoment coalition enabled it to be brought to the Senate floor and consid-
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During the debates over CERCLA, several members of Congress pointedly raised fears about the potency of retroactive liability. 49 Senator
Domenici went so far as to openly propose an amendment to limit the
scope of CERCLA's retroactivity." Such firm opposition by Domenici
and other key Senators boded poorly for CERCLA passage as the last
days of that Congress wound down." Several compromise bills were
quickly brought to the forefront in the hopes that some type of bill could
survive.' Unfortunately, "[n]othing resembling the usual open process
of congressional debate occurred. All discussions and negotiations took
place behind closed doors. " ' Thus, CERCLA analysts and courts are left
with a significant void in the bill's legislative history.' This vacuum in
the record has proved crucial because so much of the bill's liability impact has been left to judicial interpretation, which has proceeded without

ered. Indeed, within a matter of hours that fragile coalition began to disintegrate to the point, in our judgment, it would now be impossible to pass the
bill again, even unchanged....
Had we changed a coma [sic] or a period,
the bill would have failed. With the evaporation of the balance of interests
which permitted us to go to the floor in the first place, amendments to the
bill will kill it if it is returned to the Senate.
126 CONG. REC. at Hl1,772 (daily ed. Dec. 3, 1980) (emphasis added), reprinted in
COMMITTEE PRINT, supra note 42, at 774-75.
49. See Freeman, supra note 41, at 672. Senators Domenici, Bentsen and Baker
openly expressed reservations about any CERCLA retroactivity prior to the Bill's enactment. See COMMIrrEE PRINT, supra note 42, at 427 ("The issue of applying the new
standards retroactively remains a troubling one. While the Committee accepted a
Domenici amendment to limit the scope of the retroactivity, the issue remains unresolved."). The Senators also expressed concerns about the enforcement motivations of
the Justice Department regarding CERCLA, noting that a Department employee had
stated that "government is perfectly prepared to punish the innocent for the sins of
the guilty." See id. at 428 (emphasis added). But see Nova Chems., Inc. v. GAF
Corp., 945 F. Supp. 1098, 1105 n.12 (E.D. Tenn. 1996) (discounting the Senators' statements because they are "additional views" and thus are "unpersuasive" as support of
congressional intent disfavoring retroactivity).
50. See Freeman, supra note 41, at 673 (quoting S. REP. NO. 848, at 427 (1981).
51. See id.
52. See id. at 673-74.
53. Id. at 674. Several have noted the "stealth" character of CERCLA's legislative
journey. See United States v. Olin Corp., 927 F. Supp. 1502, 1513-14 (S.D. Ala. 1996),
rev'd, 107 F.3d 1506 (lth Cir. 1997); Freeman, supra note 41, at 675-78; Grad, supra
note 40, at 1.
54. See supra notes 44-48 and accompanying text; see also Nova, 945 F. Supp. at
1104 n.9 (stating that the journey of the bill through Congress produced "no conference report").

a detailed roadmap of legislative history.' Additionally, the bill's final
language lacks the sharpness and polish of most bills, fostering much
unnecessary ambiguity. 6 Ihe twin effects of an incomplete legislative
history and ambiguous bill language has left the courts with a great deal
of discretion in interpreting CERCLA retroactivity.57 So far, courts have
foisted retroactivity onto CERCLA application and have unanimously
found the necessary legislative history or intent.' Judicial analysis has
centered on finding the requisite congressional intent.' Still, many
courts have found "clear intent" on the part of Congress and empowered
CERCLA with retroactivity, despite the sparse record on the issue.'

55. See Freeman, supra note 41, at 674 ("Neither transcripts of committee hearings
or bill mark-ups or any report of these informal gatherings, which might be analogous to a committee or a conference report, issued along with the compromise bill,
are available for examination.").
56. See id. Senator Randolph claimed that "backroom negotiators had deliberately
created ambiguity and equivocation in the statute by deleting provisions." Id. In fact,
Congress apparently intended for the Courts to shoulder the burden of interpretating
many elements of CERCLA using common law guidelines. See id.; see also Oswald,
supra note 12, at 579 & n.41, 599-600 & n.77 (noting this intent regarding the strict
liability aspect which is not explicitly laid out in the statute). Compounding the problem for courts, the bill did not; receive the requisite and usual editing attention. See
Ohio ex rel. Brown v. GeorgeofT, 562 F. Supp. 1300, 1310 n.12 (N.D. Ohio 1983) (noting that CERCLA was "rushed through a lame duck session of Congress, and therefore, might not have received adequate drafting").
57. Congress could have mooted all discussion of retroactive application by inserting an express retroactivity clause, but chose not to do so. See Georgeqff, 562 F.
Supp. at 1309 ("It would have been a simple matter for Congress to have included a
provision within the Act providing that liability would be imposed retroactively ...
Yet, Congress failed to make this statement.").
58. See, e.g., United States v. Northeastern Pharm. & Chem. Co., 810 F.2d 726, 73234 (8th Cir. 1986); Georgeoff, 562 F. Supp. at 1313-14.
59. See Northeastern, 810 F.2d at 732-33; United States v. Olin Corp., 927 F. Supp.
1502, 1512-16 (S.D. Ala. 1996), rev'd, 107 F.3d 1506 (11th Cir. 1997).
60. See Northeastern, 810 F.2d at 733; Georgeoff, 562 F. Supp. at 1310-14. Some
courts have found the necessary congressional intent in what has been called a
"negative inference." Nova Chems., Inc. v. GAF Corp., 945 F Supp. 1098, 1103 (E.D.
Tenn. 1996); see also Ninth Ave. Remedial Group v. Fiberbond Corp., 946 F. Supp.
651, 655 (N.D. Ind. 1996) (finding that the "negative inference" logic was persuasive
as to CERCLA being retroactive). This line of reasoning flows from the fact that
Congress expressly excluded retroactive application for natural resource damages
under CERCLA. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(f)(1) (1994) ("There shall be no recovery . . .
where such damages and the release of a hazardous substance from which such
damages resulted have occurred wholly before December 11, 1980." (emphasis added)). Therefore, this argument asserts that because Congress did not expressly exclude retroactive application for PRP liability that by "negative inference," it intended
CERCLA to operate retroactively in this area of liability. See Nova, 945 F. Supp. at
1103.
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While not expressly promulgating retroactive liability, CERCLA's statutory language apparently allows for such an interpretation." The Act's
preamble, for example, announces that Congress enacted CERCLA for
the purpose of cleaning up "inactive hazardous waste disposal sites."'
Several courts have found in this avowed statutory purpose a designation
of congressional intent, arguing that the use of the word "inactive" could
only indicate sites damaged prior to CERCLA's 1980 enactment.' Somewhat more broadly, courts also have pointed to this preamble as generally indicative of a retroactive statutory scheme because of the remedial
tone established by its language.'
Going beyond the preamble, the statutory interpretations have focused
primarily on the language of 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a), which identifies a PRP
as:
(1) the owner and operator of a vessel or a facility,
(2) any person who at the time of disposal of any hazardous substance owned
or operated any facility at which such hazardous substances were disposed of,
(3) any person who by contract, agreement, or otherwise arrangedfor disposal
or treatment, or arranged with a transporter for transport for disposal or treatment, of hazardous substances owned or possessed by such person, by any other
party or entity, at any facility or incineration vessel owned or operated by another
party and containing such hazardous substances, and
(4) any person who accepts or accepted any hazardous substances for transport
to disposal or treatment facilities, incineration vessels or sites selected by such
person, from which there is a release, or a threatened release which causes the
incurrence of response costs, of a hazardous substance, shall be liable ....

61. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a).
62. See id. § 9601; see also Georgeoff, 562 F. Supp. at 1311 & n.13 (referencing
CERCLA's preamble as support for retroactive application).
63. See Northeastern, 810 F.2d at 732-33 (claiming the statutory scheme is "overwhelmingly remedial and retroactive"); United States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., Nos.
87-CV-920 & 91-CV-1132, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16358, at *12-14 (N.D. N.Y. 1996) (arguing that use of the word "inactive" in a House Report concerning CERCLA establishes Congress's retroactive intent); Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Agway, Inc., No. 92-CV0748, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14196, at *25-27 (N.D. N.Y. 1996) (highlighting the use of
the term "inactive" in congressional reports as in Alcan); United States v. Shell Oil
Co., 605 F. Supp. 1064, 1071 (D. Colo. 1985) (discussing various House Reports which
evidence the retroactive intent of congress in passing CERCLA); Georgeoff, 562 F.
Supp. at 1311 & n.13 (noting CERCLA's repeated references to "inactive" waste sites
"indicating Congressional intent to focus on past . . . conduct").
64. See Northeastern, 810 F.2d at 732-33; Georgeoff, 562 F. Supp. at 1311.
65. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (emphasis added).

The language that pertains to CERCLA retroactivity is, of course, the
noticeable past tense language of several clauses within this liability
section.' Some courts perceive this past tense language as a manifestation of Congress' intent for retroactivity, while others find the statutory
language to be non-determinative on the issue. 7 Certainly, the 96th Congress could have eliminated the judicial guesswork by including an unequivocal statement of retroactive application in the statute.' This vacuum has led to dual interpretations of CERCLA's language; some believe
that omission of a clause indicates a lack of retroactive intent on the
part of Congress, while others maintain that the scheme clearly intends
retroactivity and that no retroactivity clause is needed to clarify that purpose.' The statute's hurried passage and troubled legislative journey, as
a practical matter, suggest that an express retroactivity clause would
have precluded passage of any CERCLA-type legislation."
With many of the 1980 congressional concerns resurfacing, CERCLA
currently faces a pitched reauthorization battle.71 CERCLA's tangible
problems have intensified and hardened these initial concerns during the
intervening seventeen years.' In fact, these concerns stretch down

66. See id.
67. See Northeastern, 810 F.2d at 732-33 (finding the "statutory scheme" retroactive). But see Shell Oil Co., 605 F. Supp. at 1073 (finding that congressional intent
"cannot be divined" from the verb tenses in § 9607(a)); Georgeoff, 562 F. Supp. at
1311 (finding the past tense language to be non-dispositive).
68. See supra note 57; see also United States v. Olin Corp., 927 F. Supp. 1502,
1515 (S.D. Ala. 1996), rev'd, 107 F.3d 1506 (11th Cir. 1997) (noting "that it would
have been a simple matter for Congress to have" expressly included retroactivity in
the statute and that Congress was aware "that the issue of retroactivity could arise").
69. See Georgeoff, 810 F.2d at 733 (stating that "the statutory scheme itself is overwhelmingly remedial and retroactive").
70. See Freeman, supra note 41, at 676 (quoting a letter from Senators Stafford
and Randolph to the House urging them not to alter the Superfund bill in even the
most minimal sense).
71. See Ways-Means, supra note 24, at 365. These concerns primarily focus on a
grossly inequitable allocation of cleanup costs created by the combination of retroactive and strict liability. See id. Secondary concerns include protection of certain segments, such as lenders, from unnecessary and unfair liability. See id. Overarching all
concerns is the worry about footing the bill for the cleanups because, as always,
Congress declares that new taxes will not be part of the funding mix. See id.
72. Chief among those problems are the delay in cleanup, the eye-popping costs,
and the apparent lack of fairness in some elements of the liability scheme. See Anderson, supra note 2, at 20; Dancy & Dancy, supra note 10, at 105 (stating that
"[elven though private and public entities have already spent $20 billion on the
CERCLA program since its inception, only around ten to twenty percent of the sites
designated for cleanup under that program have been remediated"); Healy, supra note
10, at 67 (noting that "estimated hazardous substance cleanup costs [rival.] the costs
of bailing out the nation's savings and loan institutions").
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Pennsylvania Avenue to the White House, where President Clinton has
characterized CERCLA as a "disaster." ' Despite an increasing sense of
urgency and the apparent need for action, the reauthorization bills remain bogged down in congressional committees as sparks fly over eliminating retroactivity.74 Several congressional leaders have called openly
for elimination of judicially-entrenched retroactivity." Other members of
Congress have decried the shift in the Republican Congress to a stance
favoring the polluters, with one Congressman labeling an appropriations
bill as the "Ed McMahon Polluter's Clearinghouse Sweepstakes" because
it pays the polluters rather than forcing the polluter to pay.78 The outcome of future elections may ultimately determine the congressional
direction of CERCLA retroactivity and materially affect
the already frag77
ile balance between economics and the environment.
B. Early Cases EstablishingRetroactive Liability:
Georgeoff & Its Progeny
Because the statute did not expressly grant CERCLA retroactivity, the
courts were soon forced to step into the breach and interpret the statute
in this area. The early cases set a tone which remains largely unchanged and was unquestioned until 1996.7° Some have argued that the

73. See Dancy & Dancy, supra note 10, at 105 (quoting Reilly, supra note 19, at
57).
74. See H.R. 2500, 105th Cong. (1997).
75. See Ways-Means, supra note 24, at 365 (reporting that House Ways-Means
Committee Co-Chairs Archer and Gibbons warn that CERCLA will not be reauthorized
unless retroactivity is expressly repealed).
76. See 142 CONG. REC. H6778-01 (daily ed. June 25, 1996) (statement of Rep.

Markey).
77. See Tucker, supra note 25, at C1 (stating that "[tihe Superfund retroactivity liability issue is more likely to be resolved through a legislative re-examination by Congress than by the courts"). Because Republicans have led the onslaught on CERCLA
reform, the 1996 election which ended with Republican majorities in House and Senate, may impact CERCLA reauthorization going forward. See id. (commenting that
"Congressional Republicans [have]... proclaimed that the [Olin decision] was a watershed event.").
78. See, e.g., United States v. Northeastern Pharm. & Chem. Co., 810 F.2d 726 (8th
Cir. 1986); Ohio ex rel. Brown v. Georgeoff, 562 F. Supp. 1300 (N.D. Ohio 1983).
79. No case prior to Olin has failed to find retroactivity in CERCLA liability. See
United States v. Olin Corp., 927 F. Supp. 1502, 1507 (S.D. Ala 1996), rev'd, 107 F.3d
1506 (11th Cir. 1997); United States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., Nos. 87-CV-920 & 91CV-1132, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16358, at *7 (N.D.N.Y. Oct. 28, 1996).

early judicial precedents establishing CERCLA retroactivity have carried
too much weight and, to a certain degree, have precluded a more thor-'
ough judicial analysis of the issue because a mass of cases have simply
relied on the "pathfinder" cases without giving the arguments against
retroactivity a full and proper consideration.'
Ohio ex rel. Brown v. Georgeoff, a 1983 CERCLA case, proved to be
the influential father of CERCLA retroactivity.8 The Georgeoff court in
the Northern District of Ohio, first found that CERCLA liability required
retroactive application of the statute.' While duly noting the general
rule disfavoring retroactivity, the court pointed out that two Supreme
Court cases have "arguably.. . changed [this] to a presumption in favor
of retroactivity," and nevertheless held that CERCLA had overcome any
presumption against retroactivity.8" To reach this finding, the court first
examined the language of the statute and, while they found no "unequivocal statements" indicating a clear intent for retroactivity, they did
find "indicia" of congressional intent.' Next, the court analyzed the legislative history of the bill and discovered congressional intent to make
responsible industries pay for waste site cleanup of both active and inactive sites.' Accordingly, the court concluded that CERCLA retroactive
liability was authorized and held that CERCLA could be applied retroactively to conduct prior to 1980.8
The Georgeoff ruling cast a shadow over the CERCLA retroactivity
analysis which followed. 7 While most cases simply marched into line
behind Georgeoff, two cases stand out because they made more than a
superficial inquiry into the question and found CERCLA to apply retroactively.' Northeastern, an Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals case, found
the entire "statutory scheme" to be indicative of retroactive intent on the

80. See Olin, 927 F. Supp. at 1507; see also Government Defends Retroactive Liability in Appeal of District Courts Olin Decision, BNA NAT'L ENv. DAILY, Oct. 8,
1996 (presenting Attorney Michael W. Steinberg's view that a large body of preLandgraf cases "settled for less than clear [congressional] intent").
81. 562 F. Supp. 1300 (N.D. Ohio 1983).
82. See id. at 1306 (denying the Department of Justice's argument that continuing
ownership did not require such an application).
83. See id. at 1308 (citing Bradley v. School Bd. of the City of Richmond, 416 U.S.
696 (1974); Thorpe v. Housing Auth. of the City of Durham, 393 U.S. 268 (1969)).
84. See id. at 1309-11.
85. See id.
86. See id. at 1313-14.
87. See United States v. Olin Corp., 927 F. Supp. 1502, 1509 (S.D. Ala. 1996), rev'd,
107 F.3d 1506 (11th Cir. 1997) (discussing the precedential impact of Georgeqff).
88. See, e.g., United States v. Northeastern Pharm. & Chem. Co., 810 F.2d 726 (8th
Cir. 1986); United States v. Shell Oil Co. 605 F. Supp 1064 (D. Colo. 1985).
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part of Congress,8 while Shell, a Colorado District Court case, noted a
similar scheme supporting CERCLA retroactivity." A groundswell of
cases followed the analysis laid out by these leading cases, with no more
than a passing analysis, and further entrenched the judicial view that
CERCLA required retroactive application to pre-1980 conduct."' United
States v. Olin Corp., a 1996 Alabama District Court case, stands apart as
the sole decision refusing to apply CERCLA retroactively.'
Judicial opinions since Olin have not only regarded Olin as renegade,
but have distanced themselves from its reasoning and continue to invoke
the Georgeoff logic in maintaining retroactivity.' Typical of other jurisdictions, a Pennsylvania District Court openly declared that "we are unpersuaded by a single Alabama District Court case." 4 Cooper v. Agway,
in holding CERCLA to apply retroactively, added that "tilt is clear that
the expectations and preparations of the parties... have changed because of the Olin case, not because of a change in the law." 5 Most sig-

89. Northeastern, 810 F.2d at 732-33.
90. Shell Oil Co., 605 F. Supp. at 1075-76.
91. See In re Penn Cent., 944 F.2d 164 (3rd. Cir. 1991); United States v. Monsanto
Co., 858 F.2d 160 (4th Cir. 1988); Nevada ex re. Dep't of Transp. v. United States,
925 F. Supp 691 (D. Nev. 1996); In re Acushnet River & New Bedford Harbor Proceedings re Alleged PCB Pollution, 716 F. Supp. 676, 679 n.3 (D. Mass. 1989); United
States v. South Carolina Recycling and Disposal Inc., 653 F. Supp. 984 (D. S.C. 1984).
See also United States v. R.W. Meyer, Inc., 889 F.2d 1497, 1506 (6th Cir. 1989); O'Neil
v. Picillo, 883 F.2d 176, 183 n.12 (1st Cir. 1989); Organ, supra note 18, at 1046 n.19
(noting that many courts have cited the Northeastern decision in finding retroactivity
in CERCLA) (citing Monsanto, 858 F.2d at 173-74)).
92. See Gould Inc. v. A&M Battery & Tire Serv., 933 F. Supp. 431, 438 (M.D. Pa.
1996).
93. See Nova Chems., Inc. v. GAF Corp., 945 F. Supp. 1098, 1100-07 (E.D. Tenn.
1996); Gould, 933 F. Supp. at 438; United States v. NL Indus., Inc., 936 F. Supp. 545,
556-63 (S.D. Ill. 1996); Ninth Ave. Remedial Group v. Fiberbond Corp., 946 F. Supp.
651, 664 (N.D. Ind. 1996).
94. Gould, 933 F. Supp. at 438.
95. Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Agway, Inc., No. 92-CV-0748 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14196,
at *23 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 23, 1996); see also United States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp.,
Nos. 87-CV-970 & 91-CV-1132, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16358, at *7 (N.D.N.Y. Oct. 28,
1996) (noting that "one recent decision has created a bevy of motion practice
throughout the nation"). The lasting significance of Olin may be its impact on the
legislature's reauthorization of CERCLA rather than on the judiciary's interpretation of
retroactivity. See Mary Powers, U.S. Judge's Superfund Ruling Could Prod Congress
to Speed Reform, HAZARDOUS WASTE Bus. June 5, 1996, at 1. Powers points out that
the ruling could pressure Democrats to, in the words of one party member,
"negotiat[e] in good faith." See id. at 2. Republicans have been much more supportive

nificantly, the Eleventh Circuit's recent reversal of Olin has effectively
muzzled this solitary judicial attack on CERCLA retroactivity.' Still, the
underlying problems with retroactive application endure.'
C. United States v. Olin: A Lone Wolf Howling in the Wind?
Judge Hand's Olin decision controverted an established body of law
which undergirded CERCLA retroactivity. 8 To accomplish this, the Alabama District Court borrowed its primary framework from a 1994 Supreme Court decision declining to find retroactivity in a Civil Rights
statute.' Rather than overturning prior judicial precedent on their own
reasoning, and in effect turning their swords upon themselves, Judge
Hand went to a higher source, the United States Supreme Court."'0
Piggybacking Landgraf,Olin resurrected the traditional rule against presumptions of retroactivity and found that CERCLA could not withstand
those presumptions when applied forcefully."'
1. Landgraf Framework
The 1994 Supreme Court holding of Landgraf v. USI Film Products102 provided the structural framework enabling the Olin court to

of a CERCLA compromise but are still pushing for an overturn of retroactivity. See
id. at 3.
96. Some argued that because of its Constitutional foundations, Olin might be upheld. See Powers, supra note 95, at 2. Of course, Olin's reversal revealed that view
to be somewhat hopeful. See United States v. Olin Corp., 107 F.3d 1506 (11th Cir.
1997).
97. See infra Sections III and IV.
98. See Alcan, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16358, at *7 ("Although the retroactive effect
of CERCLA has been upheld by the vast majority of Courts that have addressed the
issue, one recent decision has created a bevy of motion practice throughout the nation.") (footnote omitted).
99. Olin, 927 F. Supp. at 1508 (citing Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244
(1994)). The fact that the court did not decide Landgrof until 1994 may explain the
noticeable omission of any serious attempt by prior courts to question retroactivity.
See id. at 1508 (asserting that Landgraf undercuts the justifications used by prior
cases finding CERCLA retroactivity).
100. See id. at 1517 (calling pre-Landgtrf cases "unreliable").
101. Landgrof "reaffirmled] the traditional presumption against retroactive legislation." Id. at 1508. In so doing, the Court apparently restored this presumption and
called into question other cases which had blurred the rule. See id. at 1508-09.
102. In Landgraf, the plaintiff charged a co-worker with sexual harassment under
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, of 1964, which only authorized equitable relief.
Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 249. The case was originally dismissed by the District Court.
See id. While her appeal pended, the Civil Rights Act of 1991 became law. See id.
The Act included a right to recover compensatory and punitive damages. See id. The
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ignore the prior findings of CERCLA retroactivity. 3 The Landgraf
Court first focused on the traditional presumption against retroactive
application of statutes."° According to the Court, the initial level of
analysis must construe the language of the statute with an eye to this
presumption. 5 If the language of the statute fails to unequivocally express retroactivity, then the analysis must turn to an inquiry into congressional intent.'" According to Landgraf, absent a clear indication of
congressional intent, the presumption against statute retroactivity must
govern. 7 The Court held that there was no clear congressional intent
regarding the particular Civil Rights statute in question."° Thus, the
heavy traditional presumption against retroactive application of a statute
carried the day."° In so holding, the Court appeared to rectify past

Supreme Court held that the Act did not apply retroactively and that Landgraf could
not bring an action for such damages. See id. at 286.
103. See Olin, 927 F. Supp. at 1511-19. Judge Hand summarized the Court's analysis
as follows:
[It] requires a court 1) to determine a) whether Congress has expressly stated the statute[']s reach and b) if not, whether the text and legislative history
have "clearly prescribed" Congress' [sic] intent to apply the provision retroactively; 2) if not, to determine whether the provision actually has "retroactive
effect on the party or parties in the litigation;" and 3) if so, to apply the
traditional presumption against retroactivity-absent a clear congressional intent to the contrary.
Id. at 1511.
104. See Landgrqf, 511 U.S. at 265 ("[T]he presumption against retroactive legislation
is deeply rooted in our jurisprudence, and embodies a legal doctrine centuries older
than our Republic.") (citing Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v. Bonjorno, 494 U.S.
827, 842-44, 855-56 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring)). Landgraf then highlighted some of
the fundamental rationales for such a presumption. The Court first noted fairness. See
id. ("[I]ndividuals should have an opportunity to know what the law is and to conform."). Then it mentioned the legitimate expectations of individuals in knowing the
law and conforming conduct to it. See id. (citing General Motors Corp. v. Romein,
503 U.S. 172 (1992)). Finally, the Court delineated the concept of creativity in "commercial and artistic endeavors [which] is fostered by a rule of law that gives people
confidence about the legal consequences of their actions." Id. at 266.
105. See id. at 270-73.
106. See id. at 272, 280.
107. See id. at 280.
108. See id. at 286.
109. See id. ("[Wle have found no clear evidence of Congressional intent that section 102 . . . should apply to cases arising before its enactment."). The Court noted
that a prior 1990 version of this civil rights statute had included a retroactivity
clause, but it was vetoed by President Clinton primarily because of the clause. See

Court holdings which seemed to call the traditional rule into question
and which, according to some interpretations, turned the presumption on
its head.'1° In restoring order, the Court laid the groundwork for a
court to overrule the retroactivity of other statutes which did not have
the concomitant clarity of congressional intent."' The Olin court soon
alighted upon the potential Constitutional weakness of CERCLA retroactivity resulting from the Landgraf holding and took advantage of this
weakness by denying CERCLA liability for Olin Corporation's actions
prior to 1980.112
2. Olin Analysis
The Olin court borrowed the Landgrafframework to deny retroactive
application of CERCLA." 3 In Olin, the parties filed a proposed consent
decree concerning Olin's corporate property in Alabama on which a mercury-cell chlorialkali plant had released mercury into groundwater until
1974 and a drop-protection chemicals plant had discharged wastewater
until 1974.114 The district court found prior CERCLA retroactivity to be
5
misapplied by the courts in light of Landgraf."
Specifically, the court

id., at 255-57. The Court added, however, that this fact was not dispositive. See id. at
256. After a thorough flushing out of the bill's language and history, the Court concluded that "the history of the 1991 Act conveys the impression that legislators
agreed to disagree about whether and to what extent the Act would apply to
preenactment conduct" See id. at 263. The Court thus perceived that the legislative
history evinced no clear intent for retroactivity and that ultimately the default rule
disfavoring it would take effect. See id. at 265.
110. See Thorpe v. Housing Auth. of the City of Durham, 393 U.S. 268 (1969);
Bradley v. School Bd. of the City of Richmond, 416 U.S. 696 (1974); see also Ohio ex
rel. Brown v. Georgeoff, 562 F. Supp. 1300, 1308 n.9 (N.D. Ohio 1983) ("[T]he presumption against retroactivity has arguably been changed to a presumption in favor
of retroactivity.").
111. See Freeman, supra note 41, at 664 (asserting that after Landgrf "it is . . .
clear that eight justices believe there must be a 'clear statement' of congressional intent for a federal statute to be interpreted as applying new liability retroactively").
But see James Cable v. Jamestown, 43 F.3d 277 (6th Cir. 1995) (claiming that the
Court ruling in Landgraf was a "reiteration .. . not a radical reformulation" of the
approach towards retroactivity).
112. United States v. Olin Corp., 927 F. Supp. 1502 (S.D. Ala. 1996), rev'd, 107 F.3d
1506 (11th Cir. 1997). Prior to the Olin ruling one commentator predicted that if a
federal court were to face the issue of Superfund retroactive liability "§ 107(a) could
not meet the test of statutory construction set forth in Justice Stevens's majority
opinion in Landgraf." See Freeman, supra note 41, at 664.
113. See Olin, 927 F. Supp. at 1508-20.
114. See id. at 1504-05.
115. See id. at 1519.
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transposed the Landgraf analytical structure onto CERCLA. 6 In doing
so, it determined that CERCLA contained no unequivocal expression of
retroactivity, although it did discover non-dispositive "indicia" of such an
intent."7 The court then surveyed the legislative history of the Act and
found no clear congressional intent favoring retroactivity." 8 The court
concluded by applying the presumption against retroactivity while ignoring the pre-Landgrafcases which injected CERCLA with its retroactive
9
The court held that CERCLA § 107(a) 2 ° was "not retroacpower."1
121
tive.
3. Olin's Reversal by the Eleventh Circuit
Olin's "mini-revolution" ended before it reached the streets.'" In
March 1997, the Eleventh Circuit overruled Olin; Judge Kravitch, writing
for a unanimous Court of Appeals, held that CERCLA supported retroactive application to pre-CERCLA conduct."= Contravening the district
court, Judge Kravitch asserted that CERCLA met the Commerce Clause

116. See id. at 1511.
117. See id. at 1513 (quoting Ohio ex rel. Brown v. Georgeoff, 562 F. Supp. 1300,
1311 (N.D. Ohio 1983)).
118. See id.at 1512-19.
119. See id.at 1519.
120. CERCLA § 107(a) identifies the PRPs and provides the controversial past tense
language. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
121. Olin, 927 F. Supp. at 1519. Although the court did not need to reach the question, Olin also overturned liability on Commerce Clause grounds. See id. at 1533. Utilizing another recent Supreme Court decision, United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549
(1995), Olin found that the Commerce Clause prohibited Congress from regulating
this waste. See id. at 1523. According to Olin, Lopez required that the statute must
itself "regulate economic activity which 'substantially affects' interstate commerce" and
that the statute include" a jurisdictional element which would ensure, through case by
case inquiry, that the statute affects interstate commerce." See id. at 1532 (quoting
Lopez, 514 U.S. at 559-60). Olin found that CERCLA did not contain the necessary
jurisdictional element and moreover, even if it did, that the "activity in question has
virtually no effect on interstate commerce." See id. at 1533. Thus, Olin held that
CERCLA exceeded Congress' Commerce Clause power. See id. Several other courts
have strongly disagreed with the Olin holding regarding the Commerce Clause. See,
e.g., Nova Chems. Inc. v. GAF Corp., 945 F. Supp. 1098 (E.D. Tenn. 1996); United
States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., No. 92-CV-0748 1996 WL 637559 (N.D.N.Y. 1996);
United States v. NL Indus., 936 F. Supp. 545 (S.D. Ill. Oct. 28, 1996).
122. See United States v. Olin Corp, 107 F.3d 1506 (lth Cir. 1997).
123. See id.at 1514.

challenge and, more significantly, the retroactivity challenge."' Agreeing
with the district court that the presumption against retroactivity remained in force, Judge KMavitch still found that CERCLA's language,
structure, and legislative history sufficed in the absence of an express
retroactivity clause in the statute. 2 ' The court held that the requisite
congressional intent was in place to override the traditional disfavoring
of retroactive statutory application. 2 '
4. A CERCLA World Without Retroactivity: The Potential Impact
Olin's reversal by the Eleventh Circuit does not dim the controversy
over CERCLA retroactivity; the underlying issues remain. That decision
simply halts, for now, the wholesale elimination of retroactivity by the
courts."7 Congress may still reform CERCLA to wholly eradicate retroactivity or dampen its impact on "innocent" PRPs.12
Any alteration of CERCLA retroactivity will impact the act's liability
scheme more than its clean-up purpose; hazardous waste site
remediation and clean-ups will continue to plod forward.129 The health
and safety hazards are clearly too serious and the environmental and
human costs are clearly too high to end remediation entirely."3° Furthermore, eliminating site clean-up and remediation would essentially vaporize the fundamental purpose of CERCLA.- 13'

124. See id. at 1511, 1514.
125. See id. at 1512-14.
126. See id. at 1514.
127. Generally, the courts must decide the whole issue of retroactivity; they cannot
"legislate" a middle ground as this Comment proposes with a negligence standard of
culpability for pre-enactment PRPs. See infra notes 228-32, 236-41 and accompanying
text. Thus, if a court concludes that Congress intended retroactivity, then the court
must hold in favor of such a statutory application. See, e.g., id. (finding clear congressional intent for retroactive application of CERCLA).
128. See supra notes 71-77 and accompanying text.
129. Some disagree that any realistic move forward on clean-up has occurred under
the retroactive liability scheme anyway. See Lyons, supra note 4, at 272-73 & nn.9-10
(arguing that billions of dollars have been wasted on transaction costs in CERCLA
litigation which could have been utilized for cleanups). By the mid-1980s, it was estimated that because of immense transaction costs, 400-450 sites on the National Priorities List (NPL) remained unremediated which otherwise may have been cleaned up.
See id. at 272 & n.9 (citing Senate Hearing in Insurance Issues and Superfund:
Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Env't and Pub. Works, 99th Cong., 134 (1985)
(statement of John Butler)).
130. About 75% of sites remain to be cleaned up. See EPA Is Making Progress On
Speeding Up Superfund Cleanups, WEST'S LEGAL NEWS, Oct. 17, 1996, available in
1996 WL 592354.
131. See Healy, supra note 10, at 77 (noting "CERCLA's paramount objective of facilitating the cleanup of hazardous waste sites that pose a threat to public health or
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The probable impact, then, of wholly or partially eliminating CERCLA
retroactivity would be a revenue shortfall. 32 The revenue lost from pre1980 PRPs who would no longer be liable must necessarily be found elsewhere." This revenue burden could default to several groups such as
post-1980 PRPs, industry (by way of Superfund taxes), the states, or
taxpayers.' Certainly, the cost burden of going forward stands as the

the environment").
132. One study claims that financing would have to increase two to three times
over the present standards were the elimination of retroactive liability the only reform to the statute. See Dancy & Dancy, supra note 10, at 122 n.89 (citing Rena I.
Steinor, The Reauthorizationof Superfund: The Public Works Alternative, 25 Envtl. L.
Rep. (Envtl. L Inst) 10, 78-79 (Feb. 1995)); see also Current Owners Could Foot
CERCLA Bill If Olin Decision Holds Up, Attorney Asserts, ENV'T REP. (BNA) 1207,
Sept. 25, 1996 [hereinafter Current Owners] (noting Barry Breen's argument that prospective application would "gut the 'polluter pays' principle" and potentially create
monetary shortfalls for both state and federal governments); Retroactivity, Funding,
Allocation Issues Dominate Reform Discussion at ABA Session, BNA NAT'L ENV'T
DAILY, Aug. 10, 1995 (citing concerns by lawyers about "revenue shortfall" where
CERCLA liability was to be eliminated by Congress). In contravention of this view,
Senator Robert C. Smith and Representative Michael B. Oxley commented that a raise
in taxes is not likely if retroactive liability were to be eliminated. See Exception for
Federal Facilities Sought in Call to Eliminate Retroactive Liability, 25 Env't Rep.
(BNA) at 1870 (Feb. 3, 1995). These influential congressmen imply that certain types
of tax breaks as incentives for voluntary cleanups and several efficiency changes
could reinvigorate CERCLA in the face of any loss of revenue due to retroactivity
elimination. See id.
133. See Dancy & Dancy, supra note 10, at 122-23 & n.90 (noting that Congress
may be forced to place heavier tax burdens on the general public, businesses, or
industry groups) (citing a study concluding that maintaining the current cleanup standards would require "more trust fund revenues") (citing See Costs Similiar for Five
Funding Schemes Proposed for Program, Joint Study Finds, 25 Env't Rep. (BNA)
No. 39, at 1872 (Feb. 3, 1995)).
134. The Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA) modified
the CERCLA funding scheme, which had been primarily financed by taxes on the
petroleum and chemical industries, to add a general tax on business. See 26 U.S.C.
§§ 59A, 4611, 4661 (1994); Healy, supra note 10, at 99-102 & n.137. Superfund primarily taxes feedstock chemicals and petroleum companies. Other Superfund revenues
come from a corporate environmental income tax and a small amount is generated
from general tax revenues. See Healy, supra note 10, at 100 n.137; Hedeman, supra
note 11; see also Lyons, supra note 4, at 273-74 (arguing that Superfund funding
should come solely from taxation). The potential impact on the states is considerable
if retroactive liability (or joint and several liability) is radically altered. See
Superfund: Elimination of Retroactive Liability Would Hurt the States, NAAG Attorney Says, DAILY ENV'T REP. NEWS, Dec. 10, 1993, available in WESTLAW BNA-DEN
File (discussing comments of counsels who believe that state standards cannot be

defining issue of the CERCLA world sans retroactivity.'"
On the positive side, eliminating retroactive application lowers transaction costs." Because retroactivity enlarges the pool of PRPs outward
in concentric proportions, its elimination would immediately limit the
numbers of litigants at any given site."a7 Narrowing the pool of potential
PRPs will materially reduce the revenues upon which Superfund current1
ly draws.
Scholars and members of Congress have promoted compromise in the
form of "carveouts," excluding liability for certain groups of PRPs perceived to be only tenuously responsible for the hazardous waste damage
at the particular site." These carveouts would protect unfairly vulnerable groups such as small businesspersons, innocent transporters of hazardous substances, lenders, and municipalities."4 Others have clamored

separated from CERCLA standards and that such an impact could be disastrous in
terms of cleanup because a substantial number of waste sites cannot be cleaned up
by the EPA and thus will default to the state programs). States have, thus far, footed
little of the remediation tab. See Wamsted, supra note 20, at 1, 12 (noting that states
have paid less than one percent of CERCLA costs).
135. This is particularly true because Congress chose to create a far-reaching, inclusive liability scheme which encompassed all who touch a site. In doing so, Congress
consciously chose to shift the financial burden of clean-up away from the taxpaying
public and onto those potentially culpable parties, the PRPs. See Lyons, supra note 4,
at 310-11 & n.181. See generally Dancy & Dancy, supra note 10, at 120-23 (discussing
the issue of increased funding for CERCLA were retroactive liability to be eliminated).
136. See Daniel Abuhoff et a]., Superfund Reform Now Rests in Hands of GOP,
NAT'L LJ., Dec. 5, 1994, at CIO (noting that CERCLA's liability scheme results in
repeated litigation); Shanahan, supra note 17, at 5 (arguing that retroactive liability
creates an endless cycle of lawsuits).
137. One noted Connecticut case included over 1200 third parties before the judge
radically pared it down to a manageable number. See B.F. Goodrich v. Murtha, 815 F.
Supp. 539 (D. Conn. 1993); see also Mark Mininberg & Katharine S. Goodhody, The
Superfund Crisis in the Federal Courts: A Case Study, 25 Env't Rep. (BNA) 139
(May 20, 1994). The 1200 parties included Josephine Kriz, whose deceased husband
had simply discarded an old couch in a dumpster owned by Harold Murtha, the
prime defendant and owner of a waste disposal company. Id. at 140.
138. Estimating the Superfund revenue shortfall from the elimination of retroactivity
is difficult at best. See Dancy & Dancy, supra note 10, at 122-23 & nn.89-90. Some
argue that because of "wasted" transaction costs which inevitably result in every
CERCLA action, the revenues the EPA receives may not be affected as much as most
think. See id. at 123 n.90; Shanahan, supra note 17, at 4.
139. The EPA, while not favoring carveouts per se, has headed in that direction by
setting out policies in favor of settlements for de minimis and de micromis PRPs
(small-volume waste contributors). See CERCLA Settlements With De Micromis Waste
Contributors, 24 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1939 (1994) [hereinafter CERCLA Settlements].
CERCLA expressly authorizes such settlements. See 42 U.S.C. § 9622(a)-(m) (1994).
140. 142 CONG. REC. H6772-74 (daily ed. June 25, 1996) (letters of Commerce Com-
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for a more drastic 50% "retroactivity discount." M These exclusions and
liability caps would likely result in large corporations with the historical
"deep pockets" shouldering the bulk of the cost. Ultimately, Congress
must re-formulate the retroactivity rules in the brave new CERCLA world
or the courts will be forced to step into the void once again.
III.

THE CONTROVERSY REVISITED: ARGUMENTS FAVORING RETROACTIVITY

CERCLA retroactivity supporters arduously defend the statute along
several lines.'" First, they point to the statute's role in stemming environmental disasters.'
Second, they argue that the polluter must pay
for his act, regardless of when he committed it or how legal it was at the
time.'46 Third, the supporters claim that eliminating retroactivity will

mittee Ranking Member John Dingell and EPA Administrator Carol M. Browner); see
also Anderson, supra note 2, at 5-6 (classifying the different proposals for CERCLA
reform). In 1993 several in Congress made a serious attempt to severely limit liability
for municipal landfills. See 139 CONG. REC. S5947 (daily ed. May 13, 1993) (introducing the Toxic Cleanup Equity Act of 1993 which requires the EPA to limit the
amount of its settlements with local governments) (comments of Sen. Lautenberg).
The Clinton administration itself has proposed liability exclusions for small businesses
with fewer than 25 employees and under $2 million in revenues. See Elliott P. Laws,
EPA's Perspective: Measuring Superfund Success, 11 (No. 12) ENVTL COMPUANCE &
LITIG. STRATEGY 4, 4-5 (1996). The administration has also pushed for municipal liability limits. See id. at 5. The EPA has proposed exemptions for businesses with
fewer than 100 employees, homeowners, and small nonprofit organizations. See id. at
5. Underlying all of these concerns and leading to such proposals are four principles
which Laws, an assistant administrator, says the EPA has now focused on: "(1) cleanups must be faster, fairer and more efficient; (2) we must promote economic development in our communities; (3) less money should go to lawyers and more money
should go to cleanups; and (4) the party responsible for the pollution, not taxpayers,
should pay for the cleanup." Id. at 4.
141. 142 CONG. REC. H6773-74 (daily ed. June 25, 1996) (letter of EPA Administrator
Carol M. Browner).
142. See Anderson, supra note 2, at 34; Goldberg, supra note 19, at 708 (quoting
Gordon Humphreys, EC: Insurers Face Large Clean-Up Bills If Commission's Environmental Liability Proposals Are Adopted, Reuters Textline, Mar. 9, 1992, available
in LEXIS, Europe Library, Alleur file).
143. See Anderson, supra note 2, at 56; Dancy & Dancy, supra note 10, at 149; Evans, supra note 16.
144. In the midst of their strenuous defenses, many supporters confess to the
statute's questionable success at properly cleaning up sites and allocating costs fairly.
See Healy, supra note 10, at 84; Blaymore, supra note 22, at 4.
145. See infra notes 148-53 and accompanying text.
146. See infra notes 154-58 and accompanying text.

severely hamstring the necessary funding for site clean-ups. "7 Lastly,
they assert that Congress intended CERCLA to be retroactive.'
A. EnvironmentalDegradation
Certainly, eliminating CERCLA retroactivity may impair the unfinished
cleanup of waste sites across the country. Many of the serious problem
sites remain unremediated; at least one study estimates that only 237 of
the 1292 worst sites have been cleaned up. " 9 Apparently, a great deal
of the damage occurred at sites prior to 1980." While this has not been
adequately proven, statistical data warrants caution about eliminating all
retroactive application because so much of the site damage was carried
out prior to CERCLA's enactment.' Proponents of retroactivity maintain that its elimination would contradict CERCLA's intended purpose to
remediate waste sites through the "polluter pays" vehicle.8 " Moreover,

147. See infra notes 158-63 and accompanying text.
148. See infra notes 164-67 and accompanying text.
149. See Dancy & Dancy, supra note 10, at 105 n.7 (citing Shanahan, supra note
17).
150. See Gergen, supra note 12, at 689 n.203 (claiming that 27% of the National
Priorities List (NPL) sites received contamination from their current owners and operators exclusively, while noting that it is unclear whether the other 73% of sites were
primarily contaminated by their current owners alone); Lyons, supra note 4, at 301 &
n.145 (stating that by the late 1970s the yearly amount of hazardous waste generated
in the United States was around 80 billion pounds) (citing S. EPSTEIN ET AL, HAZARDOUS WASTE IN AMERICA 7 (1982)) (emphasis added). More tragically for those who
have been harmed is the fact that the serious danger of the hazardous waste threat
was not fully comprehended until it was far too late. See Lyons, supra note 4, at 278
& n.27 (noting that uncertainty about the dangers of trace elements of a hazardous
waste are particularly troublesome).
151. See Lyons, supra note 4, at 278. On the other side, many assert that retroactive application of CERCLA has only contributed to unconscionable delays and bungled clean-up jobs. See Hedeman, supra note 11, at 17-18 (citing the Sasser Report
which found that only 4% of NPL sites had been cleaned up by 1990). For example,
the site ranked number one on the NPL and remained on the list for eight years
before material work began on the site. See id.
152. See Current Owners, supra note 132. There is a great deal of contention over
whether the "polluter pays" concept of CERCLA fundamentally works to clean up
sites. In fact, many advocate the position that the current CERCLA liability scheme
serves only to delay cleanups rather than accomplish them. See Hedeman, supra note
11, at 3. Critics contend that the liability scheme, because it fosters so much litigation, only serves to inhibit the necessary environmental remediation of the sites and
that it will require a great deal of streamlining in order to bring the statute in line
with its purpose. See id. at 17 & n.75 (referring to a Rand report finding that an
average site cleanup under the current scheme does not begin, on average, until eight
years after EPA learns of the problem). More critically, according to the Sasser Report, only 4% of sites on the NPL have been remediated. See id. (citing The Sasser
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the fear exists that any site left untouched could, over time, become
another Love Canal, and that eliminating retroactive liability altogether
could produce such a bitter result." While retroactive liability is not a
panacea, it is medicine that, at the very least, halts the onset of further
diseased waste sites. "5
B. Who Will Payfor Cleanup: Making the PolluterPay
CERCLA retroactivity directly provides a sizeable part of the substantial remediation and clean-up tab needed for waste sites across the country. 55 CERCLA's avowed purpose is to make the polluter pay." This
intent was largely derived from the belief that, as between innocent taxpayers and "guilty" polluters who benefited from their harmful behavior,
it was the polluters who should bear the economic responsibility for
their acts, regardless of whether the acts were legal at the time. 57 Proponents argue that ending CERCLA retroactivity will unfairly shift the
revenue burden to present owners or taxpayers alone.'5 Without reve-

Report). The delays and incomplete cleanups are largely due to the inbred over-litigation of every case. See id. at 3 (analyzing the innumerable incremental steps that result in every CERCLA action and the stall tactics and challenges which have become
ingrained in the process of identifying and pursuing PRPs).
153. See supra note 34.
154. See Anderson, supra note 2, at 19 (pointing out that retroactive liability for
CERCLA is comparable to that of car makers in that the parties are required to fix
modern problems created by old actions). But see Lyons, supra note 4, at 292 (noting that retroactive liability like that found under CERCLA has been uncommon in
modem tort law, and comparing it to asbestos litigation).
155. See Lyons, supra note 4, at 311-12 (asserting that CERCLA compensation from
PRPs is primarily a scheme for paying for hazardous waste threats and serves no
other realistic purpose).
156. See Anderson, supra note 2, at 7; Dancy & Dancy, supra note 10, at 116 n.61;
Organ, supra note 19, at 1046-48; Lyons, supra note 4, at 306.
157. See Development, supra note 22, at 1540. Of course, this theory is based upon
the premise that a benefit accrued to the particular PRP. See id. at 1541-42; Lyons,
supra note 4, at 303-04. In many cases, that benefit may never have occurred, particularly given some PRPs' minimal connections to a waste site. See Dancy & Dancy,
supra note 10, at 116-17 (asserting that parties who did not benefit or only intangibly
benefited can be entirely liable because more responsible PRPs have vanished); Lyons, supra note 4, at 303-04 (claiming that no "necessary correspondence" between a
PRP's gain and its financial responsibility for a site needs to be shown). The case of
Troop 1313 is another example of a case where a PRP received no benefit from
ownership of the land and certainly was not the cause of the waste problems.
158. See Current Owners, supra note 132. But see Anderson, supra note 2, at 28-29

nue there is no cleanup; the very existence of the Superfund shows the
critical nature of cost in enacting environmental change.6 9
C. CERCLA Revenue Problems
The CERCLA reauthorization battles in the 105th Congress reveal the
scope of the revenue concerns in the face of potential retroactivity elimination."' In June 1996, a Republican-led Congress attempted to pass a
Superfund revenue bill piggybacked on an appropriations bill for Veterans Affairs."' Democrats charged that the appropriation would include
rebates to polluters for past payments and thus "pay the polluter,"
flaunting CERCLA's purpose." Beyond such "rebate" attempts, leaders
in both political parties have pledged their determination not to increase
taxes to fill a CERCLA funding shortfall created by the elimination of retroactive liability. '6 Thus, ending CERCLA retroactivity will fundamentally alter the economic landscape of waste site cleanup."

(arguing that the burden of funding will fall on those who finance Superfund, which
is supported by taxes on industry and thus the "public" will not necessarily foot the
bill for the lost revenue); Dancy & Dancy, supra note 10, at 121-22, 122-23 n.90 (noting that the states, who pay very little of the burden, may face an increase, and
highlighting the comments of several Congressmen who doubt taxes would increase if
retroactive liability were to end); Hedeman, supra note 11, at 4 n.5 (stating that
Superfund financing largely comes from taxes on the petroleum and chemical industries). Furthermore, the current liability scheme may not be as fair as it appears
because the EPA and other PRPs often single out "deep pocket" PRPs for attack and
these parties end up footing a substantial portion of the liability bill under the threat
of joint and several liability. See Van Cleve, supra note 10, at 2 n.13 (arguing that
the EPA targets "deep pockets" and thus pressures them to clean -up the sites).
159. Estimates of the average cost to clean up a single site range between $20
million and $50 million. See Gergen, supra note 12, at 628 n.16. The Congressional
Budget Office has estimated that 2300 to 10,100 future sites still need to be cleaned
up at a present cost of $42 billion to $120 billion. See Wamsted, supra note 20, at
12. As of 1994, $10.8 billion Superfund dollars had been spent: See Shanahan, supra
note 17, at 2.
160. CERCLA was set to expire Dec. 31, 1995. See House Committee Leaders, supra
note 25. The arguments over an extension of CERCLA funding proved to be acerbic.
See 142 CONG. REC. H6770-H6779 (daily ed. June 25, 1996).
161. See 142 CONG. REC. H6770-81 (daily ed. June 25, 1996).
162. See 142 CONG. REC. H6771-72 (daily ed. June 25, 1996) (statement of Rep.
Dingell).
163. See Dancy & Dancy, supra note 10, at 123 n.90; House Committee Leaders,
supra note 25.
164. For example, states may be required to fund a materially higher percentage of
clean-ups than they currently do. See Dancy & Dancy, supra note 10, at 121-22 (stating that states currently fund less than 1%of total cleanup costs under CERCLA).
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D. CERCLA Has the Requisite CongressionalIntent to
Apply Retroactively
Contrary to its detractors, retroactivity supporters find open declarations of intent in the sparse legislative history of the statute, the statutory language, and the scheme of the statute.'" In fact, while the legislative history is relatively limited, there are some fairly significant indications that CERCLA should have retroactive application.' Moreover,
supporters say, the statute indicates a retroactive intent in its language,
particularly in its past tense usage.' 7 On balance, they argue that
enough momentum exists to override any presumption against retroactive application of the statute.'8
IV. THE CONTROVERSY REVISITED: ARGUMENTS RENOUNCING RETROACTIVITY

CERCLA retroactivity detractors, who rail against its egregious effects,
attack with an increased enthusiasm now that one court has sided with
them. 9 As the fundamental prongs of their attack, opponents of

165. See, e.g., United States v. Northeastern Pharm. & Chem. Co., 810 F.2d 726, 73233 (8th Cir. 1986). But see Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 285-86 (1994)
(noting the justification that "retroactive application of a new statute would vindicate
its purpose more fully" is inadequate to overcome the general presumption against
retroactivity).
166. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 96-1016, pt. 1, at 63 (1980), reprinted in 1980
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6119, 6140 (statement of then-Rep. Gore stressing that chemical companies should have known what they were doing and that they benefited from their
practices).
167. Some argue that the past tense language is clear evidence of congressional
intent in favor of retroactivity. See United States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp. Nos. 87CV-920 & 91-CV-1132, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16358, at *7-8 (N.D.N.Y Oct 28, 1996);
Northeastern, 810 F.2d at 732-33. Others argue that the language is temporal, only
applying to polluters after 1980, with no indication of congressional intent authorizing
retroactivity. See United States v. Olin Corp., 927 F. Supp. 1502, 1513 (S.D. Ala. 1996),
rev'd, 107 F.3d 1506 (lth Cir. 1997). Still a third argument asserts that the statutory
language covers both pre-enactment and post-enactment conduct in that the pre-enactment conduct is continuing to cause a post-enactment "'release' or 'threatened release.'" United States v. South Carolina Recycling & Disposal, Inc., 653 F. Supp. 984,
996 (D.S.C. 1984).
168. See The Ninth Ave. Remedial Group v. Fiberbond Corp., 946 F. Supp. 651, 664
(N.D. Ind. 1996); Nova Chems., Inc. v. GAF Corp., 945 F. Supp." 1098, 1103 (E.D.
Tenn. 1996).
169. Representative Michael Oxley (R-Ohio), sponsor of Superfund reform legislation
in the House, has said that this case engenders "a whole new ballgame" as far as

CERCLA retroactivity articulate several justifications for its defeat: the
specific lack of Constitutional Due Process and general lack of fairness,
the costly vagaries of economic uncertainty it produces, and the unfair
allocation of cleanup costs due to a potent CERCLA liability scheme of
retroactivity, strict liability, and joint and several liability. 7 '
A. Due Process
CERCLA's questionable due process elicits the most vehement challenges from the varied opponents of retroactivity."'1 Their overarching
argument, based primarily upon the Fifth Amendment," underscores
the temporal legality of PRP conduct at the time it occurred, emphasizing
that retroactive application of CERCLA to conduct that was legal before
1980 eradicates a PRPs' fundamental due process rights."r Moreover,
the presence of strict liability and joint and several liability magnifies the
problems inherent in the retroactive application of CERCLA, because this
retroactivity also necessarily draws a wider web of blameless conduct
into a rubber-stamped predetermined liability scheme against which a
PRP has no defense."'

CERCLA liability goes. Hazardous Waste: Justice Department, GOP Congrssman
Disagree on Impact of Superfund Ruling, BNA NAT'L ENV'T DAiLY, May 29, 1996.
170. One commentator has called CERCLA's liability structure an "'octopus-like' liability scheme" because of lack of fairness inherent in its powerful reach. See Evans,
supra note 34, at 2.
171. See Dancy & Dancy, supra note 10, at 112; Blaymore supra note 22, at, 20-36.
172. "No person shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law ....
" U.S. CONST. amend. V. In addition to the Fifth Amendment, some
justify elimination of retroactivity on the basis that it is an ex post facto law and, as
such, is unconstitutional. See Shanahan, supra note 17, at 4. The Constitution states
that "No . .. ex post facto Law shall be passed." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl.3. An ex
post facto law punishes an act which was innocent at the time it was performed. See
Shanahan, supra note 17, at 4. But see Blaymore, supra note 22, at 46-49 (underscoring the concept that the ex post facto doctrine applies to criminal laws) (citing
Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798) (emphasis added). Of course, the doctrine
could apply if CERCLA was deemed a criminal statute. See id.
173. See Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 266 (1994) (noting that the "Due
Process Clause also protects interests in fair notice and repose that may be compromised by retroactive legislation . . . ."); see also Dancy & Dancy, supra note 10, at
111-12 (claiming that acts "perfectly legal and in conformity with industry custom" at
the time are now causing' liability); Hedeman, supra note 11, at 4 (stating that liability occurs even though the acts were lawful at the time); Blaymore, supra note 22, at
20 (noting the due process claims of those who performed legal acts now being
found liable); Lyons, supra note 4, at 291-93 (lamenting the fact that those who properly disposed of their waste following current legal guidelines can now be found
liable under CERCLA retroactivity).
174. See supra notes 2-12 and accompanying text. Opponents of retroactivity point
to the liability of parties like Troop 1313 or the seller of dog food, Russ Zimmer. See
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Proponents of retroactivity, while agreeing that due process goes
astray, assert that much case law stands for the proposition that, in instances of furthering a "public purpose"'75 or where the legislation rationally spreads costs to those who profited (the so-called "rational
means test"), as long as the means are rationally related to its purpose,
retroactivity is constitutionally acceptable.'76 Thus, they argue that hazardous waste disposal seminates a significant societal harm whose tremendous cost must be spread out among the evil-doers (those who benefited should pay) and that the resulting due process concerns fail to
override the necessary retroactivity of CERCLA' 77 Opponents of retroactivity reply that cost-spreading is irrelevant to past CERCLA violations
and that this class of PRPs could not plan or budget for such contingencies because they had no ability to predict that their legal and honest
conduct would later create substantial liability. 78
This cost spreading concept of strict liability loses its attractiveness
when applied retroactively because the polluter often had no real choice
as to a course of action because he understood his actions at the time to
be completely legal."v In fact, because they often met the highest dis-

supra notes 2-3 and accompanying text. See also O'Neil v. Picillo, 883 F.2d. 176, 178,
183 (1st Cir. 1989) (holding liable for $1.4 million dollars a party who was responsible for only a trace of the contamination).
175. Nachman Corp. v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 592 F.2d 947, 958 (7th Cir.
1979). Nachman concerned the constitutionality of the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act (ERISA) requiring employers to provide pension benefits to workers who
had terminated employment in the year immediately preceding its passage. See id. at
950.
176. See Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1, 18 (1976) (creating the
rational means test to measure retroactivity against the loss of due process). In
Usery the Court upheld a statute which imposed liability on the coal industry to
compensate former employees harmed by black lung disease. See id. at 19-20.
177. See United States v. Northeastern Pharm. & Chem. Co., 810 F.2d 726, 733-34
(N.D. Ohio 1983) ("Congress acted in a rational manner in imposing liability for the
cost of cleaning up such sites upon those parties who created and profited from the
sites and upon the chemical industry as a whole.") (citation omitted).
178. See infra notes 204-05 and accompanying text. The general concept is the tort
concept of strict liability, that whoever gains from their conduct should also shoulder
the costs to society of their behavior. See Oswald, supra note 12, at 593 n.52.
179. See Anderson, supra note 2, at 35 (noting retroactive liability is "difficult to
pass forward to consumers and is difficult to avoid by altering behavior or eliminating risk-producing inputs"); see also Schwarz, supra note 12, at 825 (claiming that
retroactive liability will not promote risk-spreading). But see Healy, supra note 10, at
81-86 (retroactive liability may, in fact, impact and deter future behavior because "'the

posal standards at the time, the polluter was spreading the costs in the
best manner available."8° In addition, a related cost-spreading issue reveals some poignant irony: because of a massive hazardous waste insurance void, post-1980 PRPs drawn into the CERCLA liability scheme at
any given site cannot spread the costs through insurance and pay for the
retroactively liable insolvent or unavailable PRPs for whom that same
insurance was readily available.'81 Thus, retroactive application of
CERCLA undercuts both the strict liability cost-spreading rationale and
insurance availability to present owners of hazardous waste sites-a
particularly unfortunate result for those who never benefited from ownership of the land in question."
Compounding the inequities of CERCLA retroactivity is the scientific
inadequacy of the pre-CERCLA cleanup conduct; many polluters were
only following the scientific protocol, as archaic as it may now seem, at
the time." These polluters argue, with' considerable justification, that
their actions fell within the standard of care required at the time."u In
fact, many waste disposers utilized "cutting edge" practices." Govern-

expectation that future evolution in the law will be made applicable to harms arising . . . prior to the announcement of new rules will have a desirable effect on behavior'"). Id. at 84 n.68 (quoting Louis Kaplow, An Economic Analysis of Legal Transitions, 99 HARV. L. REV. 509, 599-600 (1986)).
180. In other words, the polluter was choosing to spend the most money possible
to safeguard the hazardous waste. See Anderson, supra note 2, at 25.
181. See infra note 205 and accompanying text.
182. See Dancy & Dancy, supra note 10, at 116-17.
183. See Oswald, supra note 12, at 603 n.94 (noting that "liability under CERCLA is
determined by current scientific knowledge and understanding of what is hazardous,"
and adding that "an activity that was considered safe and acceptable in 1979, for
example, could give rise to liability in 1992 if scientific advances were now to demonstrate its hazardousness"). Compounding this problem is that, while CERCLA's chief
purpose is to charge those who benefit with the cost of cleanup, those who do not
benefit, or those who only benefit in a very minute way, often end up paying. See
Dancy & Dancy, supra note 10, at 116-17.
184. See Anderson, supra note 2, at 25. Moreover, as several scholars and some
members of Congress have pointed out, we are essentially adjudging past actions by
modem advanced scientific standards-a process which could endlessly regenerate
itself. See id. at 26 (citing H.R. REP. No, 96-1016, pt. 1, at 17 (1980), reprinted in
1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6120); Lyons, supra note 4, at 293.
185. See Anderson, supra note 2, at 25-26. In the 1950s, landfill operators dug
trenches and then covered the waste placed therein on a daily basis with "six inches
of fly ash or dirt and . . . a two-foot layer of dirt when the trench was full." See id.
at 25. Even more telling is the fact that many of these so-called "disposal practices"
were "explicitly" okayed by the government or were followed by the local government landfill. See id. at 26. It is particularly ironic that land disposal was presented
as preferable to sewage disposal, yet those who bucked the norm (perhaps dishonestly?) now face no liability problems while land disposers confront massive liability for
honest and legal acts. See id. But see Lyons, supra note 4, at 275 n.15 (highlighting
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ment officials often permitted, and even encouraged, a multitude of pre1980 disposal efforts. 1" Now, these same law abiders have become law
breakers; the science they relied upon has spumed them. 187
B. InequitableAllocation of Costs
The unfair allocation of cleanup costs among PRPs elicits measured
and harsh responses from opponents of retroactivity.'8 In theory,
CERCLA intends to make the polluter pay while allocating the liability to
those parties who most benefited from the use of the site." Yet, the
potency of the CERCLA liability scheme repeatedly holds parties with
barely traceable connections to the waste site (such as Troop 1313) financially responsible for cleanup. 9 ' Moreover, CERCLA's liability
scheme has a unique equilibrium: it similarly attacks the deep pocket
offenders, who repeatedly pay more than their fair share of liability simply because they are able to. 9' Both ends of the liability spectrum-the
"deep pocket" corporate PRP and the smaller "empty pocket" party with
barely traceable links to the site-suffer from the frequent presence of

a 1978 EPA study noting that 90% of hazardous wastes were probably not being adequately taken care of) (citing Fed. Reg. 58,948 (1978)).
186. See Anderson, supra note 2, at 26 n.117 (giving examples of situations where
government officials expressly okayed disposal techniques) (citing Joel A. Tarr, Historical Perspectives on Hazardous Wastes in the United States, 3 WASTE MGMT. &
RES. 95, 99 (1985)).
187. Extreme examples include corporate officers who followed appropriate scientific guidelines at the time they directed disposal, yet who suddenly find themselves
personally liable for their honest and legal actions. See Oesterle, 'supra note 22, at 67
n.27.
188. See Anderson supra note 2, at 6-7; Dancy & Dancy, supra note 10, at 116-18.
189. See Anderson, supra note 2, at 7 ("The idea behind the CERCLA liability system is deceptively simple: make the polluter pay.").
190. 132 CONG. REC. E132743 (daily ed. April 23, 1986) (stating that those liable
"can be held responsible for full costs even if what it did was totally without fault
and had only the most trivial consequences'") (quoting Robert D. Kilpatrick,
Superfund Insurance Problems Symptom of Flaws in Tort System, FINANCIER, Dec.
1985); see Anderson, supra note 2, at 6, 8, 19 (noting that "costs are often borne by
those who are not responsible for problem at all" and adding that CERCLA has become a "Liability Lottery"); Dancy & Dancy, supra note 10, at 116 (commenting that
retroactivity does not influence PRP acts because they have already occurred).
191. See Gergen, supra note 12, at 673, 676 (claiming that PRPs with the financial
foundations should be ready to confront claims because the less financially capable
parties are not as attractive); Van Cleve, supra note 10, at 2 n.13 (asserting that the
EPA strategically targets the few "deep pockets").

the "orphan share. " "" These orphan shares hinder equitable cleanups
because they often represent the most culpable party, yet will not have
to shoulder any of the liability and their cost share gets consumed by
other, often less culpable, parties. 3
Clearly, Congress was aware of these dangerous allocation inequities
from the beginning. Then-Representative Albert Gore, Jr. proposed what
have become known as the "Gore Factors" for courts to weigh when
adjudicating liability allocation for a given site.'" As the original enactment date of CERCLA fades, its inequitable allocation of liability draws
increased focus."9 5 For example, in recent years the EPA has moved noticeably towards excluding the smaller parties (de minimis and de
micromis) from the liability maelstrom.9 6 Other attempts to streamline
the litigation process have included the use of non-binding allocations of
responsibility (NBARs), covenants not to sue, settlements with de minimis and de micromis parties, and model consent decrees.' 7 Despite

192. The liability deepens with the existence of "orphan shares"-the shares of parties who have gone bankrupt, become insolvent or in some other way are unable to
pay cleanup costs. See Evans, supra note 16 and accompanying text.
193. See Evans, supra note 16; see also Anderson supra note 2, at 23-24 (arguing
that orphan share allocation may not be fair); Tucker, supra note 25, at Cl.
194. The six Gore Factors are as follows: (1) the ability of the parties to distinguish their contribution; (2) the amount of the hazardous waste; (3) the degree of
toxicity; (4) the degree of the parties' involvement in generation, transportation, treatment, storage, or disposal; (5) the degree of care; and (6) the degree of cooperation
with federal and state officials. See 126 CONG. REC. 26,781 (1980); see also Development, supra note 22, at 1533-34 (discussing the Gore Factors and their applicability).
Gore's factors were not adopted by Congress in CERCLA, but a House Judiciary
Report posited that they would be fair guidelines for allocating costs in contribution
actions. See H.R. REP. No. 99-253(iii) (1985), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3038,
3042. CERCLA provides that "[iun resolving contribution claims, the court may allocate response costs among liable parties using such equitable factors as the court
determines are appropriate." 42 U.S.C. § 9613(0(1) (1994). Courts have frequently
utilized the Gore Factors in their Superfund allocation decisions. See, e.g., United
States v. A & F Materials Co., Inc., 578 F. Supp. 1249, 1256 (S.D. Ill.
1984). Often the
poorly kept or missing records make liability shares difficult to determine, or commingled waste makes it fruitless to determine the level of harm caused by each PRP.
See Anderson, supra note 2, at 24; Organ, supra note 19, at nn.27, 80.
195. See Van Cleve, supra note 10 (discussing the congressional debate over
Superfund reauthorization and the proposed bill's attempts to improve the process).
196. De minimis parties are small volume waste contributors to a given site. SARA
expressly allowed for de minimis settlements (early settlements with the minimal
PRPs at a hazardous waste site). See 42 U.S.C. § 9622(g) (1994). De niicromis parties
are extremely small contributors of waste. The EPA has set up guidelines for settling
with these minimal contributors in order to facilitate cleanups. See CERCLA Settlements, supra note 139. De micromis settlements are open only to generators and
transporters-not to site owners or operators. Id.
197. See 42 U.S.C. § 9622(d), (e)(3), (f),
(g) (1994). See generally Hedernan, supra
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these recent moves to minimize the liability scheme's inequities, the
CERCLA allocation system continues, in an unfair manner, to economically shackle many PRPs while failing in its statutory mandate to hasten
and fund hazardous site clean-ups." Superfund retroactivity enables
this dangerous inequity because it engenders a liability potency nearly
impossible for the innocent to fully elude." As a practical matter,
CERCLA's retroactive application creates serious evidentiary problems;
in particular, disposal records are often lost, incomplete or missing."°
Furthermore, retroactivity, in its very nature, creates situations in which
potential PRPs from the past are dead or insolvent.2"' Thus, those truly
innocent or minimally culpable of hazardous waste disposal have almost
no available evidentiary defense.2"
C. Ability to Internalize & Spread the Costs:
Budget & InsuranceIssues
Opponents of CERCLA retroactivity further argue that it promotes
severe economic uncertainty, asserting that successful business demands
predictability and the ability to spread the costs.2' In particular, busi-

note 11, at 18-19 (analyzing the different methods of creating a fairer allocation

scheme).
198. See Superfund Attorneys Discuss Flaws in CERCLA Liability System at Law
Conference, DAILY ENvTL. REP. NEWS (BNA) at D14 (Feb. 16, 1996). Some have argued
that the EPA has not effectively used the tools at their disposal. See Van Cleve supra note 10, at 2 n.12, 13 (noting that the EPA has only entered into five NBARs
and 128 de minimis settlements at 1074 NPL sites) (citing, Superfund: Further EPA
Management Action Is Needed to Reduce Legal Expenses, U.S. Gen. Acct. Office No.
B-253857, at 6 (1994) (emphasis added).
199. See Anderson, supra note 2, at 12-13 (noting the difficulties occurring when
evidence has been destroyed or lost); Shanahan, supra note 17, at 5 (providing the

example of a business owner from the 1950s to the 1970s who would not, as a matter of course, have kept his records for such a lengthy period of time).
200. See Anderson, supra note 2, at 12-13; Shanahan, supra note 17, at 5.
201. See Anderson, supra note 2, at 12-13.
202. In allocating liability courts may consider evidence to determine if there is any
third party defense under 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b)(3), or if the waste contribution percentage of the defendant can be approximated. Thus, the lack of evidentiary materials impacts both threshold liability and liability allocation. See Anderson, supra note 2, at
24; supra note 10 and accompanying text.
203. See Freeman, supra note 41, at 682. Senators Domenici and others had similar
concerns during the passage of CERCLA in 1980. See COMMITrEE PRINT, supra note
42, at 426. Retroactive liability does not allow for efficient cost spreading. See Anderson, supra note 2, at 35. In particular, retroactivity does not enable a company to

nesses brood over two problems created by CERCLA-the loss of predictability and the difficulty of finding adequate insurance.2 One commentator notes that the "foreseeability of legal consequences is one of
the most important elements in predicting economic consequences" and
that retroactive CERCLA liability precludes the predictability necessary
to run a successful industry and attract investment."' Secondly,
CERCLA retroactivity materially affects business's ability to properly
insure against loss; in fact, environmental liability insurance is nearly
non-existent in this country following the enactment of CERCLA.2
Both of these issues address a PRPs' ability to internalize the cost of pollution. 27 Retroactive application of CERCLA does not permit such internalizing and inequitably foists the cost burden onto parties who had
no real ability to make choices by weighing the costs of polluting against
the benefits."°
D. CERCLA Retroactivity is not Supported by the
Requisite CongressionalIntent
Beyond matters of environmental policy and statutory purpose, opponents of CERCLA retroactivity argue that there is little evidence of
Congress's intent to apply CERCLA retroactively and thus such application should not be judicially favored."° This reasoning flows from the
dearth of evidence available to measure congressional intent."* As noted above, CERCLA's pilgrimage to enactment lacks the usual formal re-

pass

the costs of the pollution onto its customers and, more critically, it does not
permit the company to change its behavior or end the activity because the damage
has already been done. See id. If retroactivity were to be eliminated (in effect creating more orphan shares), those elements would be more effectively cost shifted to
the Superfund where the taxes could be raised in a parallel manner and the risk
fairly spread. See id.
204. See Dancy & Dancy, supra note 10, at 116.
205. See Freeman, supra note 41, at 682.
206. See id. at 683. Freeman also notes that this insurance void has harmed small
businesses as well as American competitiveness in a world where other countries do
not have to confront environmental retroactive liability. Id. Other commentators also
acknowledge the debilitating impact on economic competitiveness. See, e.g., Dancy &
Dancy, supra note 10, at 104-05 & n.6. See also COMMrrrEE PRINT, supra note 42, at
428 (expressing concerns of several senators about insurance issues which CERCLA
would produce).
207. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
208. See Gergen, supra note 12, at 629-30 (arguing that CERCLA's current liability
structure has provided no incentives to act responsibly primarily because no real
internalization of costs have taken place).
209. See supra notes 40-60 and accompanying text.
210. See id.
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cord necessary for adequate statutory interpretation, and the patchy
record that does exist does not reveal clear congressional intent regarding retroactivity."' A curious circle of logic results whereby many
courts find congressional intent for retroactive application while acknowledging that the legislative history is incomplete." ' Opponents
couple this lack of requisite congressional intent with the statute's failure
to expressly promulgate retroactivity in advocating that such an application of CERCLA disregards judicial precedent establishing a presumption
against retroactivity.1 3 In sum, lower courts rely on shaky grounds to
find the necessary congressional intent to buttress CERCLA retroactivity.

214

V. PROPOSALS MODIFYING CERCLA RETROACTIVITY:
THE REFORM MOVEMENT GENERALLY

CERCLA reform awaits. As more commentators analyze the endangerment of CERCLA, they advocate a broad range of cures for the statute's
evident ills.2" ' These prescriptions tend to follow one of two approaches-either they call for minor operations or they advocate major sur216
gery.
A. Minor Reforms: Carveouts
Some have proffered a restructuring in the form of carve-outs for certain PRPs to provide greater fairness in the way that CERCLA is currently administered.1 7 These carveout proposals tend to focus on PRPs in-

211. For example, no hearings were transcribed. See Freeman, supra note 41, at 18.
212. See, e.g., Ohio ex rel. Brown v. Georgeoff, 562 F. Supp. 1300, 1311-14 (N.D.
Ohio 1983) (noting that retroactivity was not raised in congressional debates, but still
finding the necessary congressional intent for it).
213. See United States v. Olin Corp., 927 F. Supp. 1502, 1519 (S.D. Ala. 1996), rev'd,
107 F.3d 1506 (lth Cir. 1997); Freeman, supra note 41, at 666.
214. See generaUy Freeman, supra note 41, at 671-78. (arguing that the legislative
history of CERCLA is too incomplete to. warrant a finding of adequate congressional
intent to override the pervasive judicial presumption against retroactive application of
a statute).
215. See Ways-Means, supra note 24, at 365; Anderson, supra note 2, at 4-6; Dancy
& Dancy, supra note 10, at 104-06; see also Evans, supra note 16 (describing the
EPA's administrative reforms regarding the problem of "orphan shares"); Powers, supra note 95.
216. See Anderson, supra note 2, at 5-6 & nn.22-23, 47.
217. See id. at 5-6 nn.22-23, 47 (noting carveout proposals for lenders, landowners,

directly linked to hazardous waste problems at the site."' Among the
groups targeted for possible carveouts are lenders who own the property
only in transition or as the result of foreclosure. 9 Other groups include
municipalities and innocent landowners." ° While seeking to rectify situations which often produce inequitable results, such limited proposals
ignore the systemic problems of the CERCLA scheme, and, instead, only
rescue certain groups from liability.221
B. Major Reforms: Re-structuring the Liability Scheme
Much of the dialogue on reform advocates major surgery on CERCLA,
claiming that carveouts only serve to prolong the pain.' Professor Jerry Anderson has proposed that the EPA administratively assign liability,
in a cost allocating manner, rather than relying on strict liability and joint
and several liability. 3 Still others, including influential Congressman
Michael Oxley, sponsor of the CERCLA reform bill H.R. 2500, and House
Ways and Means Committee Chairman Bill Archer, have called for reform
through elimination of all or most of the statute's retroactivity. 24 Additionally, CERCLA reformers have promoted substituting strict liability

and municipalities); see also Oswald, supra note 12, at 635-36 (arguing that, CERCLA
liability should not be extended to corporate individuals because it does riot further
the goals of CERCLA).
218. See Anderson, supra note 2, at 6 (describing many of the proposals as seeking
efficiency and equity). As a cautionary note, Anderson warns that some of these proposals have built-in biases favoring a particular special interest group. See id.
219. See id. at 5-6 nn.21-22.
220. See id.
221. See id. at 48. ("Whittling away at the edges of CERCLA unfairness will not
solve the problem.").
222. See, e.g., id.
223. See id. at 48-56 (proposing that identified PRPs would have "an affirmative requirement ...
to establish where and how [their] waste was disposed of" and that
all of the information would be given to an Administrative Law Judge who would
then, based on a formula, make an assignment of shares in the liability).
224. See Ways-Means, supra note 24, at 365; Freeman, supra note 41, at 673; see
also Goldberg, supra note 19, at 713 (arguing that the European Community should
"articulate a clear policy against retroactive liability"). Republicans have pushed bills
in Congress attempting to abolish retroactivity either before 1980, or, in the alternative, 1987, and to make Superfund clean the waste up. See Powers, supra note 95;
Tucker, supra note 25.
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with a fairer negligence standard.m5 The palpable intensity of the calls
for reform indicates the seriousness of CERCLA's statutory ills; the elimination of retroactivity tops the list of potential reforms."
C. Reforming Retroactivity:A Negligence Standardfor
Retroactive PRPs
22 7
Several reformers have focused on altering CERCLA's retroactivity.
Their proposals include an elimination of retroactivity entirely or alternatively, a retroactivity discount.' To achieve the goal of fairness without gutting CERCLA's fundamental purpose, the most viable proposal is
one which would utilize a negligence standard for retroactive PRPs.2
This negligence standard would apply solely to retroactive PRPs and
leave in place the strict and joint and several liability standards for other
PRPs as well as negligent retroactive PRPs.no As a result, pre-enactment PRPs who can show that they "played by the rules" will not pay,
while pre-enactment negligent PRPs who benefited in an ill-gotten manner from their hazardous waste disposal will continue to pay their fair
share or more." l Most importantly, a negligence standard for retroac-

225. See Anderson, supra note 2, at 5 n.22 (citing Strict Liability Should Be Replaced By Negligence Standard, Industry Group Says, 24 Env't Rep. (BNA) 193 (May
28, 1993); see also Oswald, supra note 12, at 584-85 (advocating negligence standard
for corporate individuals).
226. Typical of the comments is that of Professor Anderson: "Not only is the system of assigning liability for cleanup costs manifestly unfair, it simply is not working." Anderson, supra note 2, at 4 (citations omitted).
227. See supra notes 140, 223 and accompanying text.
228. See supra note 140 and accompanying text.
229. See Dennis E. Eckart, Superfund, the Environment and Fair Taxation, WASH.
TIMES, Nov. 12, 1996, at A23 (arguing that the cost of eliminating retroactivity would
be reconstituted by the Superfund corporate taxes which are a much fairer and more
efficient method of funding waste cleanup); see also supra note 226 and accompanying text.
230. See Eckart, supra note 229, at A23.
231. Fundamental to CERCLA's polluter pays principal is the concept that the PRPs
who benefited from their evils should not escape liability. See supra notes 154-56 and
accompanying text. Utilizing a negligence standard will still ensnare this category of
polluters while granting a modicum of equity to those who acted reasonably and
fairly at the time of the disposal. See supra notes 178-80 and accompanying text. In
essence, a negligence standard, unlike an elimination of all retroactive application,
does not permit unconscionable polluters to elude liability and thus rewards
conscionable behavior. See Eckart, supra note 229, at A23.

tive liability will not severely undermine Superfund revenues because
shortfalls can be recouped through the following two financing channels:
(1) incremental Superfund tax increases on the beneficiaries of hazardous waste disposal-the chemical and oil industries;' and (2) the potential elimination of the government's transaction costs incurred in pursuing any available PRP. 33 CERCLA reform under a negligence
standard for pre-enactment PRPs upholds CERCLA integrity while largely
negating its inherent flaws.
VI. CONCLUSION

CERCLA's effectiveness remains open to question from supporters and
opponents alike.' Certainly, CERCLA's judicially sanctioned retroactivity has substantially impacted the statute's ability to clean up sites and
fairly partition the costs.23 This retroactivity has engendered serious
fairness questions, caused inequitable liabilities among PRPs, and unnecessarily endangered economic competitiveness.23 Eliminating retroactivity without requisite culpability" would re-direct CERCLA to its fundamental purpose and further streamline cost recovery and clean-up at
existing sites by eliminating transaction costs associated with PRPs who
lack practical connection to and real responsibility for hazardous
waste.' Unaware pre-1980 PRPs, like Troop 1313, would thus evade a
retroactive liability over which they had no power to avoid through internalization of costs and to -which they did not actively contribute. On the
other hand, such PRPs may have negligibly contributed to the problem
by failing to investigate the property's potential waste problems. This
omission, however, does not square with the massive costs they may be
forced to bear under CERCLA retroactivity-particularly given that, prior
to CERCLA, a purchaser of land had no duty to inquire into hazardous
waste problems.'
The negligence standard for retroactive PRPs advocated above places
the burden on those who directly caused the waste and may have benefited from it, and goes far toward ending the sting of inequity felt by so

232. See supra notes 131-33 and accompanying text.
233. See Eckart, supra note 229, at A23.
234. See Dancy & Dancy, supra note 10, at 104.
235. See supra notes 15, 17 and accompanying text.
236. See supra notes 170-207 and accompanying text.
237. See Gergen, supra note 12, at 683-86 (arguing that "Indirectly Involved Landowners" should be subject to a negligence rule accompanied by fair apportionment of
liability).
238. See id; see supra note 16 and accompanying text.
239. See, e.g., supra note 21 and accompanying text.
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24
many who innocently owned the land prior to CERCLA enactment. 1
Those pre-1980 PRPs eliminated by this standard would become "orphan
shares" and the potential funding shortfall would be shifted to the
Superfund, which is appropriately supported by the chemical, petroleum
and feedstock industries. 1 Ending retroactive liability without culpability would also materially downsize the enormous transaction costs
spent pursuing potential contributors and speed site remediation without
a complete eradication of the necessary revenue streams and without a
freeing of the culpable.242 In such an environment, we may be able to
get back to the matter at hand-cleansing the land of toxic waste-and
ignore the frantic pursuit of innocent pre-1980 owners of infected land.

KEVIN J. SLArruM

240. See supra notes 2-21 and accompanying text.
241. See supra notes 131-33 and accompanying text.
242. See supra notes 135-37 and accompanying text.

